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ince the foundation of our university, African 
Studies has been one of its outstanding interdis-
ciplinary focal points, both in research and teaching. 
In the meantime, globalization has brought the 
neighbouring continents of Europe and Africa closer 
together. Anyone who takes a realistic look at cur-
rent political, economic, and social developments 
knows that the key issues of the future – from food 
security to climate protection – cannot plausibly be 
addressed with fences, but only by working together. 
Africa today presents itself as a continent of surpris-
ing, often confusing diversity. Examples of progress 
in business and technology, humanitarian disasters, 
political corruption, and cultural creativity are often 
juxtaposed in media coverage all at once. African 
Studies therefore sees itself challenged to contribute 
to a better understanding of this interweaving of ac-
tual or apparent opposites by networking different 
disciplines, locations, and research perspectives. This 
is another reason why „multiplicity“ and „relationali-
ty“ are key concepts of our Africa Multiple Cluster of 
Excellence, which began its work at the beginning of 
2019, and is one of Europe’s leading centres for Afri-
can research.
This diversity of the African continent is reflected in 
our new edition of SPEKTRUM. It explores, for exam- 
ple, the uncertainty of life in refugee camps, the fu-
ture visions of urban middle classes, growing eco-
nomic interdependencies between countries of the 
Global South, and the linguistic diversity of Africa. 
In exemplary fashion, these contributions show how 
African Studies at the University of Bayreuth deals 
with such current and exciting topics: with field 
research on the spot, often over many years, with 
worldwide scientific networking, and with one eye 
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esearch on Africa only with Africa” is the motto 
of African Studies at the University of Bayreuth, 
established as one of our university’s internationally 
competitive, interdisciplinary research priorities over 
four decades ago. To this day, its scientific excellence 
continues to provide crucial impetus for intensifying 
and expanding the efforts of the University of Bay-
reuth for global cooperation. 
A University of Bayreuth Gateway Office in Bordeaux 
is scheduled to be established in the early summer 
of 2020. Alongside the gateway offices in Shanghai 
and Melbourne, it will already be the third office of 
its kind and is expected to further strengthen our in-
ternational networking at a European level. Having 
an office in Bordeaux will also play a key role in our 
European network in the area of African Studies – in 
fact, that was one of our reasons for choosing this 
location.
Working together with renowned partner institu-
tions on all continents, we hope to establish multi-
lateral research projects and degree programmes in 
the field of African Studies, thus developing and im-
plementing new approaches to internationalisation. 
In close cooperation with four partner universities, 
the African Cluster Centres (ACCs) and others, the 
Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence will harness the 
potential of digitization, amongst other approaches, 
for transdisciplinary cooperation and at the same 
time link very different scientific cultures.
Bayreuth‘s spirit of excellence in African Studies is 
now also reflected in our latest issue of SPEKTRUM, 
in which a number of African scholars have contri-
buted their research ideas and insights. The research 
projects behind these contributions would not have 
been possible without the close cooperation bet-
ween the University of Bayreuth and its partner ins-
titutions in Africa. I highly recommend the articles in 
this issue as a basis to provide new and unexpected 
insights into the wide-ranging field of African Stud-
ies.
Yours faithfully,
Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheibel
Vice President for Internationalisation, 
Equal Opportunities & Diversity 
at the University of Bayreuth
„R
Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheibel is 
the Chair of Biomaterials at the 
University of Bayreuth.
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n January 2019, the newly established Africa 
Multiple Cluster of Excellence started its work at 
the University of Bayreuth. The Cluster is inspired 
and supported by the commitment of outstand-
ing partner institutions on the African continent. 
Funded by the Excellence Strategy of the German 
federal and state governments, the cluster is based 
on a renowned field of expertise at the University of 
Bayreuth: Over the past four decades, the Universi-
ty of Bayreuth has developed into one of the in-
ternationally leading institutions for African Stud- 
ies.
Taking an inter- and transdisciplinary approach, 
the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence cooperates 
closely with African universities and research cen-
tres in order to advance interdisciplinary research 
and early-career support, and to further integrate 
these two elements in its expanding international 
network. The Cluster builds a firm basis for African 
Studies by connecting innovative research meth-
ods from a wide range of academic disciplines, 
including the humanities and social sciences, lit-
erature and linguistics, history and politics, law and 
economics, as well as geography and engineering 
sciences. By working together on research projects, 
scholars participating in the Cluster seek to achieve 
transdisciplinary synergies and to develop new per-
spectives with and for the African continent includ-
ing its diasporas, i.e. the people with African roots 
living in other parts of the world.
The Cluster comprises six thematic areas organized 
into „Research Sections“: „Moralities“, „Knowledges“, 
„Arts & Aesthetics“, „Mobilities“, „Affiliations“, and 
„Learning“. In addition, new and innovative ap-
proaches linking or going beyond these areas are 
encouraged. All research activities within the Clus-
ter share a common theoretical framework based 
on the key concepts of „multiplicity“, „relationality“, 
and „reflexivity“:
   Here, „Multiplicity“ means more than just the 
diversity of Africa. The concept is meant to 
capture the simultaneity of heterogeneous 
and mutually influencing ways of life that we 
find in Africa and its diasporas.
   The concept of „relationality“ emphasizes the 
complex processes of relating to one another 
and the understanding of „Africa“ as the con-
stantly updated product of relations. This re-
I „By working together on research projects, 
scholars participating in the Cluster 









Fig. 1: International cooperation partners of the 
Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence (Illustration: 
Andreas Gaube / sst).
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search approach opens up new perspectives 
on African ways of life that go beyond com-
mon dichotomies such as „north vs. south”, 
„global vs. local”, or „modern vs. traditional”.
   „Reflexivity“ refers to the fact that relational 
processes always have a reflexive character, 
as they influence and shape relationships 
through constant back and cross references. In 
addition, the concept also implies the need to 
reflect on the research process itself: scholars 
of African Studies are required to constantly 
question the premises and theoretical models 
that guide their research in Africa and other 
parts of the world. In view of the continuing 
impact of power structures going back to co-
lonial times, it is imperative for scholars to re-
flect on their position in the research process 
and to consider unequal power relations.
Fig. 2: The international conference „Africa 
Multiple: Conversations and Building Networks“ of 
the Cluster of Excellence in October 2019 concluded 
with a concert in the Margravial Opera House 
Bayreuth. From left to right: Prof. Dr. Muyiwa 
Falaiye, University of Lagos, Nigeria (ACC); Prof. 
Dr. Yacouba Banhoro, Université Joseph Ki-Zerbo, 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (ACC); Prof. Dr. Ute 
Fendler, Deputy Spokesperson of the Africa Multiple 
Cluster of Excellence; Prof. Dr. Peter Simatei, Moi 
University, Kenya (ACC); Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Seese-
mann, Spokesperson of the Africa Multiple Cluster 
of Excellence; novelist and satirist Elnathan John 
(Berlin); Prof. Dr. Stefan Leible, President of the 
University of Bayreuth; Prof. Dr. Enocent Msindo, 
Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa 
(ACC) (Photo: Robert Götze / Fabrica Lux).
Author
Sabine Greiner is Academic 
Journalist of the Africa Multiple 
Cluster of Excellence.
In line with the credo of Bayreuth African Studies, 
„Research on Africa only with Africa”, the Cluster 
pursues new research questions and theory-build-
ing together with academic partners in Africa. To 
this end, four African Cluster Centres (ACCs) have 
been established in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, 
and South Africa to create new avenues of academ-
ic cooperation:
   Université Joseph Ki-Zerbo  
in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
   Moi University in Eldoret, Kenya,
   University of Lagos in Lagos, Nigeria,
   Rhodes University in Grahamstown,  
South Africa.
The ACCs benefit from the Cluster‘s efficient re-
search infrastructure and function as active part-
ners, not merely as passive recipients of input from 
the Global North. From their African locations, they 
facilitate the exchange of ideas, the mobility of re-
searchers, and the collection of and access to data. 
Above all, the ACCs offer a platform for reflexive re-
search on the continent itself.
In addition, the Cluster maintains a number of stra-
tegic partnerships, some of which already play an 
important role in the internationalisation strategy 
Prof. Dr. Ute Fendler
is the Deputy Spokesperson of the Africa Multiple 
Cluster of Excellence and Vice Dean of Internationa-
lisation and Public Engagement. She is the Chair of 
Francophone Literatures, Cultures and Media in Africa.
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of the University of Bayreuth. These include the 
Programme of African Studies at Indiana University 
in Bloomington/USA, the Centre Les Afriques dans 
le Monde in Bordeaux, the Centro de Estudos Afro-
Orientais at the Universidade Federal da Bahia in 
Brazil, the Council for the Development of Social 
Science Research in Africa based in Dakar, and the 
Point Sud Centre for Research on Local Knowledge 
in Bamako and Frankfurt. The aim is to establish a 
global research network with regular academic ex-
change, joint conferences, and publications.
Furthermore, the Cluster pursues the goal of nurtur-
ing a new generation of early career scholars, who 
share the Cluster’s objective to reconfigure African 
Studies through transdisciplinary approaches that 
create new insights into the multiplicity of Africa 
and its diasporas. Therefore, the Bayreuth Interna-
tional Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), 
which had already received funding through the 
German Excellence Initiative from 2007 to 2018, is 
a cornerstone and integral part of the Cluster. More 
than 135 doctoral students from four continents 
have completed their doctorates at BIGSAS, and 
many have since worked at international universi-
ties, research institutes and NGOs.
Another important component of the cluster is its 
innovative Digital Research Environment (DRE). All 
cluster institutions, whether in Bayreuth, Africa, 
or elsewhere on the globe, will be interconnected 
through the DRE. The DRE not only ensures com-
munication and virtual collaboration, but also cre- 
ates the conditions for integrating the highly he-
terogeneous qualitative and quantitative data ma-
terial into a common digital research platform, thus 
making it accessible to all participating researchers.
s a result of the „digital revolution“, African 
Studies today is confronted with a wealth 
of data – on African civilizations, cultural tradi-
tions and religions, social structures and political 
systems, food security and climate change, and 
much more. This data is collected, made available, 
and used in a wide variety of formats. However, 
„silo research“, in which individual disciplines se-
parately work with subject-specific databases, has 
long since become obsolete. 
Against this background, the Digital Research En-
vironment (DRE) integrated into the Africa Multi-
ple Cluster of Excellence will be of great use for 
the necessary reorientation of African Studies in a 
number of ways. Heterogeneous sets of research 
data are brought together here in such a way that 
they can be linked and used in a wide variety of 
contexts. This creates a strong potential for inter- 
and transdisciplinary projects – and thus also for 
new and unexpected discoveries. Thus, the Clus-
ter of Excellence will demonstrate in an exem-
plary way how digitalization can bear fruit for the 
practice of research in African Studies. The open-
ness of the DRE to data from different sources and 
formats, and the transdisciplinary cooperation of 
participating research institutions, can make an 
important contribution to the democratisation 
and decolonization of knowledge about Africa. 
At present, the term „translational research“, 
which originated in medicine, is becoming in-
creasingly important. It is used to characterize 
research work that starts with findings from basic 
research, and builds bridges from there to various 
areas of society, which leads to concrete solutions 
to problems being found and recommendations 
for action. Due to the complexity of the questions 
to be solved, such a „translation“ into practice 
presupposes that the respective findings relevant 
to a particular problem can be networked and 
bundled. However, this is only possible by means 
of digitalization and with the help of powerful 
computer technologies. Therefore, the Cluster‘s 
Digital Research Environment (DRE) also has the 
function of enabling problem-specific forms of 
data use. In this way, African Studies will be in a 
position, not only to follow future developments 
on the African continent with research, but also to 
influence these via the results of its research.
Prof. Dr. Tunde Ope-Davies, 
Centre for Digital Humanities, 
University of Lagos (CEDHUL)
New synergies for African Studies:
The Digital Research Environment (DRE) of the Cluster of Excellence
Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Seesemann
is the Dean and Spokesperson of the Africa Multiple 
Cluster of Excellence. He is the Chair of Islamic Stu-







The Main Building of the Moi University in Eldoret, Kenya (Photo: Moi University, Kenya).
University cooperation in Africa
The AMAS project as a pioneer of networked knowledge production
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n 2016, five universities in different African 
countries started a new project together with 
the University of Bayreuth. The title of the Project 
„Academic Mobility for African Sustainable De-
velopment (AMAS)“ links the key concepts of this 
project with reference to Africa: Governance, social 
sciences, education, mobility, and sustainable de-
velopment. The five actors in Africa are the Univer-
sité Mohammed V de Rabat (UM5R) in Morocco, 
Addis Ababa University (AAU) in Ethiopia, Univer-
sité d‘Abomey-Calavi (UAC) in Benin, Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) in Mozambique, and Moi 
University in Kenya as Project Applicant and Coor-
dinator. As a „technical partner“, the University of 
Bayreuth contributes its experience in internatio-
nalisation processes to the project. 
This network originated from the Bayreuth Interna-
tional Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), 
which was funded from 2007 to 2018 by the Ex-
cellence Initiative of the German federal and state 
governments. From the very beginning, BIGSAS has 
relied on close cooperation with universities in Af-
rica. Together with the five universities mentioned 
above and the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South 
Africa, it established a network that in recent years 
has visibly succeeded in developing and imple-
menting new concepts of international graduate 
education in the field of African Studies. With the 
AMAS project, the universities participating in this 
network have now deepened their cooperation and 
extended it to new fields of work. Among other as-
pects, together they intend to:
   increase the mobility of postgraduate stu-
dents and postdocs; academic and research 
leaders,
   stimulate the exchange of knowledge and 
methods, but also of social and cultural experi-
ences,
   harmonise the framework conditions for study 
programmes and research projects, and pro-
mote knowledge production through intra-Af-
rican internationalisation of university/higher 
education
   and establish new forms of higher education 
governance capable of supporting the devel-
opment of collaborative research and study 
conditions in Africa and beyond.
At first glance, it might seem that AMAS is a com-
paratively conventional project for the internati-
onalisation of universities. But in fact the BIGSAS 
network has broken new ground with this project 
in many respects. Currently, there are considerable 
differences between different regions of Africa in 
the higher education sector, respectively the uni-
versities, which make cooperation more difficult. In 
addition, the long-standing „vertical“ North-South 
relations have masked the potential for South- 
South cooperation between universities in different 
African countries. However, globalisation, world-
wide trends towards the harmonisation and inter-
nationalisation of higher education systems, as well 
as expanded communication possibilities, suggest 
that the networking of African universities in par-
ticular could be a source of innovative knowledge 
production. 
The intention to explore this potential and reap the 
rewards through concrete forms of higher educa-
tion cooperation was how AMAS was originally 
conceived. How far the project, which emerged 
from the BIGSAS network, has ventured with this 
vision of governance, social sciences, and higher 
education policy, can only be seen from a historical 
perspective. 
More than 50 years ago:
New impulses, old dependencies
In 1962, UNESCO funded the first Africa-wide con-
ference on higher education. It took place in An-
tananarivo, the capital of Madagascar, and pointed 
the way to the foundation of the Association of 
African Universities (AAU). The conference report 
underlined the future importance of intra-African 
cooperation in higher education for three reasons: 
Education, especially higher education, is a key to 
economic development in Africa. It is also an es-
sential factor for social advancement and access to 
management positions. Higher education should 
therefore become an integral part of African soci-
eties. The report points out:
„For a long time to come, African universities and in-
stitutions of higher education will have to rely for their 
development on assistance and support from coun-
tries, universities and private bodies outside Africa, as 
well as from the international organizations.“ 1
I
Fig. 2: Students of the Universidade Eduardo 
Mondlane (UEM) in Mozambique (Photo: Christine 
Scherer).
„Transnational processes in higher education will also 
be a major driver of growth and development in Africa.”
Fig. 1: Entrance to the campus of the Addis 
Ababa University (AAU) (Photo: Hailu Wudineh 
Tsegaye / Shutterstock.com).
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The report hints to the consequences that impact 
universities in Africa since more than half a cen-
tury, mainly because of the continent‘s extensive 
dependence on international resources. One of the 
consequences is the paradox that African higher 
education „assumes the position of the most inter-
nationalized system by being least internationally 
engaged.” 2 The interest in involving African uni-
versities in research cooperation is growing world- 
wide. Nevertheless, the interest in research originat-
ing and driven by Africa remains underdeveloped. 
International partnerships with African universities 
are usually organised through top-down processes 
initiated outside the continent.
On our way to sustainable structures 
of transnational cooperation
This makes it all the more urgent today to use trans-
continental relations between Africa and Europe in 
the field of education to strengthen transnational 
cooperation within Africa. The focus should be on 
higher education structures and institutions. Their 
harmonisation is crucial for the creation of proper 
conditions for intra-African cooperation into the 
long term. There are already successful examples of 
this: The project „West African Science Service Cen-
tre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WAS-
CAL)“, funded by the Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF), has led to the establishment 
of ten graduate schools in West Africa.  With its net-
work of African partner universities, the Bayreuth 
Graduate School BIGSAS has created an institution-
ally anchored academic culture that takes the doc-
toral phase seriously as an important stage in life, 
and supports doctoral students accordingly.
AMAS is therefore another consistent step towards 
new structures of intra-African internationality. In 
addition to the objectives mentioned above, this 
joint project is also particularly concerned with 
offering joint doctoral and study programmes and 
integrating them into sustainable framework con-
ditions. Today AMAS offers two framework pro-
grammes:
   Special Benefit Programmes (among others): 
Doctoral programmes in the fields of „Tourism 
Management“, „Federalism and Government“, 
„Sociologie du Développement“ and „Douto-
ramento em Desenvolvimento e Sociedade”
   Common Fields of Study (among others): 
Courses for master’s students in international 
studies, anthropology, history, geography, 
literature and gender studies.
In order to operate these programmes successfully 
in the long term and to expand intra-African mobi-
lity, it is essential to harmonise higher education on 
the African continent. In Europe, such harmonisation 
began 20 years ago: In 1999, the Ministers of Edu-
cation of 29 European countries agreed in Bologna 
on a programme of higher education reform aimed 
at creating a single European higher education area. 
This was the starting signal for the „Bologna Process“: 
a top-down process that has since been gradually 
implemented in the participating European states. 
Initially, the reforms met with displeasure, protests 
and resistance from many universities, especially in 
Germany. But now it‘s clear: Without a clear vision of 
harmonisation at least at the European level, without 
growing intra-European cooperation in research, 
teaching, and study, without transnational university 
degrees and – last but not least – without the experi-
ence of common learning and research, no universi-
ty in Europe today would be sufficiently prepared for 
the challenges of the 21st century.
Accordingly, the African Union has also developed 
a strategy: the African Union Harmonization Strat-
egy for Higher Education. This strategy was further 
elaborated in the framework of the Joint Africa-Eu-
ropean Union Strategy (JAES) adopted by the Eu-
ropean Union and the African Union at their joint 
summit in Lisbon in 2007. Since 2014 it has been 
funded by the European Pan-African Programme, 
or more precisely by the Intra-Africa Mobility 
Scheme, to the tune of € 20 million in total. This 
also forms the funding framework for the AMAS 
project, the financing of which has been secured 
until 2022.
Internationalisation 
as a learning process
The achievement of the objectives initially set by 
AMAS is by no means progressing as smoothly as 
envisaged. Unexpected challenges, for which com-
mon solutions had to be found, have shown: For 
universities to truly live internationalisation is never 
easy. As in Europe, Africa also demands both an edu-
cation policy coordinated „from above“ in the form 
of a top-down process, as initiated by the African 
Union, and institutional incentives for scholars who 
have to implement the concepts of internationalisa-
tion and fill them with life. In principle, it is never 
Authors
Prof. Dr. Anne Nangulu is 
Professor of History at Moi 
University in Eldoret, Kenya, and 
Principal of Bomet University 
College, a Constituent College of 
Moi University.
Prof. Dr. Omar Egesah is 
Professor of Anthropology at Moi 
University in Eldoret, Kenya.
Dr. Christine Scherer is Coordi-
nator for Early Career & Equal Op-
portunities in the Africa Multiple 
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to 2018 she was the Scientific 
Coordinator of the BIGSAS.
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easy to persuade partner universities from different 
countries to cooperate and pull together. And if mo-
bility between African universities is to be strength-
ened, some deeply rooted expectations and preju-
dices must also be overcome: Students and teachers 
in Africa always ask whether they should apply to a 
higher education institution in Europe or to a „larg-
er“ higher education institution – and they think of 
higher education institutions outside Africa without 
considering studying in another African country. 
In addition, the AMAS project shows that the EU 
must also learn: If it wants to sustainably promote 
intra-African mobility, sensitivity and realism are 
required. The EU should be more aware than be-
fore of the protracted efforts needed to change and 
replace old frameworks in higher education at the 
transnational level. The history of the Bologna Pro-
cess provides instructive examples of this.
Outlook
University cooperation in the AMAS network has 
shown so far that both North-South and South-
South partnerships are of central importance when 
it comes to this on the African continent,
   to strengthen scientific teaching and research,
   develop best practices in higher education 
and benchmarking for innovative initiatives,  
   increase the mobility of researchers and 
teachers in order to promote sustainable de-
velopments at universities and beyond,
   to develop the internationalisation of universi-
ties in such a way that they are competitive at 
regional, national and global level.
In the future, knowledge generation will no longer 
concentrate on a few key regions of the world. Trans-
national processes in higher education will contrib-
ute to the further „multipolarisation“ of scientific 
productivity, research, and innovation in the coming 
years. They will thus also be a major driver of growth 
and development in Africa. At the same time, this 
places a demand on the agenda that African schol-
ars clearly formulate: to revise the „master narrative“ 
of a progressive modern age in which the continent 
was denied the capacity to form an independent 
intellectual agency. It is hoped that the ideas and 
experiences that have emerged from the AMAS pro-
gramme will soon be incorporated into EU funding 
schemes and programmes. Future support program-
mes financed from Africa to strengthen intra-African 
mobility will also be able to build on this foundation.
1  UNESCO: Conference on the Develop-
ment of Higher Education in Africa. 
Tananarive, 3-12 September 1962, 65. 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/
pf0000142840.
2  D. Teferra:The International Dimen-
sion of Higher Education in Africa: 
Status, Challenges and Prospects, in: 
D. Teferra, J. Knight (eds): Higher 
Education in Africa: The International 








Fig. 4: The university network of the AMAS 
project (Illustration: Andreas Gaube / sst).
Fig. 3: Students of the Universidade Eduardo 
Mondlane (UEM) in Mozambique (Photo: Christine 
Scherer).
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View of the campus of the University of Cape Town (UCT) (Photo: EQRoy / Shutterstock.
com). Small Picture: In April 2015, after sustained student protests, the statue of Cecil John 
Rhodes was removed from campus (Photo: Tony Carr / wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-2.0).
The decolonization of knowledge
Post-colonial interdependencies and new intellectual impetus
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n their book „Theory from the South“, published 
in 2012, the anthropologists Jean and John Co-
maroff talk about the necessity of an epistemologi-
cal reorientation in the cultural and social sciences.1 
Key issues for the future – from social inequality to 
migration and climate change – are becoming more 
acute and gain in contour when viewed from the 
southern hemisphere. This change of perspective 
not only leads to new questions, but also to new 
forms of theory formation, and thus, in the authors’ 
opinion, to a new approach to the world as a whole. 
An anthropology of the present is not just situated 
in space, but also in time: It opens up access to his-
torically intertwined global processes, and reveals 
glimpses on possible futures and social designs.
The following article shows how these approaches 
can be made fruitful for research within the Africa 
Multiple Cluster of Excellence and far beyond. As a 
matter of fact, the core demand formulated in the 
Cluster to reconfigure African Studies goes hand in 
hand with this shift – away from an expertise „from 
outside“ to an exchange on equal terms. At the 
organisational level, this will be strengthened by 
new forms of cooperation, such as those developed 
jointly with the African Cluster Centres (ACCs). At 
the same time, this demand also marks the need 
for new forms of theory formation, which not only 
concern the field of African Studies but also the Uni-
versity as a whole. Theories „from the South“ change 
the colonial topography of the European centre and 
non-Western periphery. They establish a new focus 
on global entanglements, demanding increased at-
tention on the practices of knowledge production 
along this process. Here, a look at the history of sci-
ence proves to be instructive.
 
Science and colonialism
The consolidation of scientific disciplines in the 19th 
century – from medicine and zoology to geology and 
statistics to archaeology and palaeontology – was 
closely linked to the practices of colonial rule, which 
still reverberate to this day.2 This becomes particular-
ly evident in those fields which made colonized peo-
ple and localities their subject of investigation, i.e. 
today‘s area studies or anthropology. Within social 
and cultural anthropology, the debate about the de-
colonization of the field already gained momentum 
along with the global independence movements af-
ter the Second World War. For example, African scho-
lars such as Bernhard Magubane and Archie Mafeje 
from South Africa formulated a sharp critique of con-
cepts such as „tribalism“ and called for a more diffe-
rentiated view of social structures. At the same time, 
they denounced the existing academic and political 
hierarchies. They criticized the dominant ethnogra-
phic view of the „foreign“ as a form of othering, i.e. 
as a juxtaposition of unquestioned self-image and 
distorting representation of the other.3 This criticism 
was strongly echoed in the post-colonial debates 
of the 1990s, in which it was increasingly pointed 
out that there could be no isolated consideration of 
cultural, social, and political phenomena without 
questioning power relations.
Today, more than a quarter of a century later, the 
questions raised back then are by no means off the 
table. In Germany, for example, they are gaining new 
momentum as a result of a long overdue public de-
bate on the country’s colonial past. The ethnological 
museums, which for a long time led a shadowy exis-
tence, are currently in the limelight. However, natural 
history collections 4 and art museums are also being 
re-evaluated according to the colonial context of 
their origins: How did the objects get into the collec-
tions? To what extent is their appropriation a part of 
processes of epistemic and physical violence? What 
multiple stores of knowledge are locked up in them? 
How can the objects, and with them, the relation-
ships from which they emerged, be redefined – in 
such a way that the historically conscious handling 
of these objects promotes a future-oriented exami-
nation of the origins and consequences of colonia-
lism?
These debates, which often take place under the 
heading of „restitution“, by no means only concern 
legal, economic, or ethical aspects. They also pro-
voke far-reaching epistemological, theoretical, and 
political questions that lead far beyond the walls 
of the museum.5 The colonial collections are by no 
means dusty relics from a bygone era, but often 
continue to be used in current research projects. 
Certain procedures and practices are still interwoven 
with colonial genealogies of knowledge.6 Indeed, 
colonial knowledge hierarchies and academic struc-
tures are far from being fully broken up. Worldwide, 
therefore, demands for further decolonization are 
becoming louder. This movement takes up the title 
of a well-known book by the Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa 
Thiong‘o: „Decolonizing the Mind“.
I
„The South African debates are a crucial catalyst 
for the reorientation of African Studies.“
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Impetus from South Africa 
for an epistemic reorientation
A look at South Africa shows how strongly ques-
tions of representation, memory, and knowledge 
are interlinked. The „Rhodes Must Fall“ campaign 
started at the University of Cape Town (UCT) campus 
in February 2015. It was directed against the conti-
nuing presence of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes, 
one of the most notorious actors and profiteers of 
colonialism in southern Africa. The campaign was 
the beginning of a comprehensive student protest 
movement producing offshoots globally. The focus 
was originally on matters of cultural heritage and 
the politics of memory. At the same time, however, 
the University as an institution, and the social con-
ditions reflected in it, were put to the test. Rhodes, 
whose vision of the British colonial empire in Africa 
stretched from the Cape of Good Hope in the south 
The Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong‘o in his book „Decolonizing the Mind. The Politics of Language 
in African Literature” calls for the African continent to emancipate itself self-confidently from the 
dominant influence of Western languages and cultures, and specifically promote its own linguistic 
diversity. His line of argument has developed in recent debates on epistemic decolonization, and 
extended to fundamental epistemic questions of knowledge production and theory formation. 
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong‘o wrote a substantial part of his work in 1984, when he was a visiting professor at 
the University of Bayreuth. Thirty years later, in May 2014, he was awarded an honorary doctorate 
from the University of Bayreuth for his life‘s work. The photo shows him at his acceptance speech. 
(Photo: Peter Kolb).
„Decolonizing the Mind“
to Cairo in the north, had, in the eyes of the pro-
testers, illegally acquired and donated the land on 
which the University was built. Moreover, he stood 
symbolically for the colonial foundations of acade-
mic knowledge production and transmission.
The South African university landscape is still char-
acterised by knowledge hierarchies, and economic 
and racialised inequality.7 The student protests 
were therefore directed on the one hand against 
the continuing neo-liberalization of the University. 
Under the hashtags #insourcing and #feesmustfall, 
demands were formulated for a socially inclusive 
university that creates decent working conditions 
for all employees – from students, to cleaners, to 
teaching staff. On the other hand, they were about 
inclusivity in relation to knowledge itself: The criti-
cal questioning of the established canon, a strong-
er sensitization of researchers with regard to their 
methods and the consequences of implementing 
them, as well as the inclusion of local forms of know-
ledge (#decolonize science) were demanded. The 
debates that followed were and are by no means 
only related to the situation in South Africa. Nor 
are they limited to day-to-day political demands. 
Rather, they are the expression of a structural and 
epistemic reorientation encompassing all areas of 
knowledge, as summarized by the South African 
historian Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni under the term 
„Epistemic freedom in Africa“.8
For African Studies in Bayreuth, numerous points 
of reference result from this. Of particular interest 
here is the question of how knowledge is made and 
unmade in specific constellations, how potent such 
knowledge is, and how it is politically embedded.9 
These South African debates are therefore more 
than a mere subject of research: They represent a 
major driving force for the reorientation of African 
Studies.
Colonial war, sheep farming and 
knowledge production in Namibia
In a joint research project, the social and cultural 
anthropologist Katharina Schramm (University of 
Bayreuth) and the historian Memory Biwa (Uni-
versity of Cape Town) investigate the connections 
between colonial power structures and knowledge 
production on the basis of the interwoven histo-
ry of Germany and Namibia. Karakul sheep (also 
called Swakara in Namibia) are entwined with post-
colonial history in many ways. In 1903 the German 
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agricultural scientist Julius Kühn brought the first 
Karakul sheep from the Caucasus to the University 
of Halle. In 1907, during the genocidal colonial war 
waged by the German Reich against Herero and 
Nama, the first sheep were exported from Halle to 
the former German South-West Africa. Here sheep 
breeding quickly developed into a central eco-
nomic factor, the curly pelt of the lambs („Persian 
lamb“) being processed into coveted fur coats. At 
the same time, the sheep played a large part in the 
colonial land seizure by white settlers. Today, the 
Swakara breed is considered part of Namibia’s nati-
onal cultural heritage. Beyond these economic and 
political aspects, sheep played an important role in 
the formation of disciplinary knowledges in zool-
ogy, agriculture, and genetics, as well as in colonial 
race science. The project has three priorities:
   The investigation of the practices by which 
the Karakul sheep were integrated into 20th 
century race science is particularly concerned 
with how disciplinary knowledge migrated 
between zoology and human biology, and 
how the boundary between humans and ani-
mals was repeatedly abolished, newly drawn, 
and shifted. The ideas of „purity“, „indigeneity“, 
„degeneration“, and „hierarchy“ are critically 
examined and tested for how they have been 
associated with certain racialized bodies, and 
continue to have an effect today.
   At the same time, the focus is on the concrete 
interaction between people and sheep, and 
the (knowledge) economies linked to them. 
The project will also investigate the tension 
between the knowledge of Namibian farm 
workers and a hierarchical construction of ex-
pertise shaped by colonial power relations.
   In addition, the project deals with the connec-
tions between silence, memory, and forms of 
resistance, especially with regard to the ex-
perience of colonial violence in the course of 
the genocide, and the continued expulsion 
of the local population and its livestock from 
their land. Following on from Sylvia Wynter‘s 
reflections on the coloniality of being, the 
question of how racializing attributions in co-
lonial knowledge formations have an identity-
forming effect but are also undermined will 
be addressed. The aim is to create an alterna-
tive archive that combines historical sound 
recordings with current material and creates 
a space for non-discursive knowledge through 
affective references.10
Fig. 1: A statue in the Namibian town of Keetmanshoop com-
memorates the arrival of the first Karakul sheep in 1907. It was 
ceremoniously unveiled by the President of Namibia in 2017  
(Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-4.0). 
1  J. and J. Comaroff (2012), see Recommended reading. 
2  Numerous studies point to these connections, including H. Tilley: Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, 
Development and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950. Chicago 2012.
3  A. Mafeje: The Ideology of Tribalism. Journal of Modern African Studies (1971), Vol. 9, Issue 2, 253-261. –  
B. Magubane: A Critical look at Indices Used in the Study often Social change in Colonial Africa. Current 
Anthropology (1971), Vol. 12, Issue 4-5, 419-431.
4  See, for example, I. Heumann et al.: Dinosaur fragments: The history of the Tendaguru expedition and its 
objects, 1906-2018. Göttingen 2018.
5  The discussion was recently triggered anew by a report commissioned by French President Macron. Abbrevi-
ated version in German: F. Sarr, B. Savoy: Give it back. On the Restitution of African Cultural Heritage. Berlin 
2019.
6  This applies above all to the life sciences. Vgl. K. Schramm (2014), see Recommended reading.
7  See also S. Dubow: Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa. Cambridge 1995. – The term „racialization“ 
refers to the processes of the historical construction of physical and cultural diversity along categories such as 
white, black, etc.  The term refers to the embedding of these processes in colonial power relations and does not 
mark any „natural“ differences.
8  S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018), see Recommended reading. 
9  This question is also a central topic in the „Knowledges“ section of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence.
10  S. Wynter (2003): Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, 
Its Overrepresentation -- An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, Vol. 3, No 3, 257-337. DOI 10.1353/
ncr.2004.0015.
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In the library of the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern African Legal 
Studies at the School of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam (Photo: TGCL).
Legal Studies 
in the East African Community
Experience and prospects in cooperative research and teaching
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hen the Tanzanian-German Centre for East-
ern African Legal Studies (TGCL), a coope-
ration project between the Universities of Dar es 
Salaam and Bayreuth, was founded eleven years 
ago at the University of Dar es Salaam, nobody 
would have dreamed that it would one day become 
one of the most important research centres and 
networks for regional integration in Africa. The re-
search focus is on the law of the East African Com-
munity (EAC), comprising of the six member states 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
and Uganda. With a study programme on EAC law 
and regional integration law, the TGCL qualifies 
outstanding East African lawyers to assume leader-
ship responsibility in their region. The programme 
not only focuses on legal education at the highest 
level, but also attaches great importance to the 
personality-building of its students, as well as inter-
disciplinarity and intercultural exchange.
The TGCL has been funded by the German Academ-
ic Exchange Service (DAAD) since 2008. To date, it 
has trained 131 master‘s and 27 PhD students from 
all six member states in the law of the East African 
Community and the law of regional integration. The 
TGCL has already acquired a reputation as a leading 
research and training institution in this field of law.
 
Comparative law teaching
in view of regional integration
Regional economic communities are playing an 
increasingly important role in the economic and 
social development of African countries. For EAC 
countries to operate successfully and achieve their 
objectives, a consensus on economic policy among 
member states is indispensable. Removing barriers 
to the free movement of goods, services, persons, 
and capital is an essential aspect in promoting 
cross-border activities. A central instrument for 
strengthening regional integration is legal harmo-
nisation. Only if there is a common environment 
in the field of economic law will it be possible to 
permanently reduce or eliminate obstacles to in-
ternational trade within a regional community. The 
EAC is therefore also working to create a favourable 
climate for flourishing trade, investment, produc-
tion, and positive competition in the individual 
member states, and thereby in the region as a who-
le, through legal harmonisation. These aspects of 
EAC law form part of the central study programme 
of the TGCL.
The TGCL study programme comprises a master‘s 
programme (LLM) and a doctoral programme 
(PhD) and is characterised by a comparative law ap-
proach. Students therefore not only acquire know-
ledge of the law of the East African Community, but 
also familiarise themselves with the legal and politi-
cal conditions of other regional economic commu-
nities, such as the European Union. The Centre be-
nefits from Tanzanian-German cooperation, which 
provides East African students and researchers with 
valuable insights into German and European law.
Professors and lecturers of the School of Law of the 
University of Dar es Salaam supervise the LLM and 
PhD students, and hold the core legal courses of 
the TGCL study programme. Instruction is also pro-
vided by numerous renowned and proven teachers 
from the East African region, Southern Africa, and 
Europe. In this way, professors of the University 
of Bayreuth are regular guests in Dar es Salaam 
teaching at the TGCL.
Annual study trips to an East African capital and 
to Europe strengthen the comparative approach 
of the TGCL, which is reflected in the LLM disserta-
tions and doctoral theses. Visits to EU institutions 
enable students to deepen their theoretical know-
ledge and establish comparative links between East 
Africa and Europe. The comparison between the in-
tegration processes in East Africa on the one hand 
and in Europe on the other is of great interest to 
both sides - particularly because each of the two in-
tegration alliances is made up of states whose legal 
systems are shaped on the one hand by common 
law and on the other by civil law. Therefore, both 
the EAC and the EU face the challenge of bringing 
these different traditions of their member states to-
gether in a common legal environment.
W Author
Carolin Herzog is Manager of 
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„With the aim of advancing regional integration 
in East Africa, the TGCL has been a pioneer in 
training experts in research and decision-makers 
in politics since 2008. I am proud and above all  
grateful to be part of the young generation of 
TGCL graduates and their dynamic network – 
especially in a historic situation where a growing 
number of African countries are preparing to 
strengthen their links with each other through 
trade and the free movement of persons.“
Louis A. Gitinywa, LLM 
(TGCL Alumnus 2016/17), 
Lawyer, Rwanda Bar Association
„Studying at TGCL has opened my eyes 
to a variety of opportunities to explore 
economic integration in East Africa 
from a new perspective. Stakeholders 
in this integration should make it their 
business to promote legal education 
and research related to the East African 
community through TGCL.“
Cecilia Ngaiza, LLM 
(TGCL Alumna 2017/18), research 
associate and BIGSAS doctoral 
researcher at the University of Bayreuth
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Cooperative research, living integration
In the field of research, the TGCL organises confer-
ences and numerous workshops. Experts from Afri-
ca and Europe come together here to reflect on the 
goals and challenges of regional integration and to 
develop new approaches. For example, a research 
workshop in August 2015 was devoted to the topic: 
„Eastern African Common Legal Space in Economic 
Law: State of the Art and Future Perspectives, with 
Consideration of the European Experience“. The fo-
cus was on the harmonisation of private economic 
law in East Africa and in the European Union, in 
particular in the areas of commercial law, compe-
tition law, intellectual property law, labour law, and 
private international law. Together the  participants 
identified the impact of regional economic commu-
nities on national laws and obstacles to regional in-
tegration – in relation to the EAC, and in relation to 
other African regional economic communities and 
the EU. The results were published in 2018 in the 
„TGCL Series“ and attracted international attention.
A special feature of the research projects and work-
shops is the high rate participation by TGCL alum-
ni. Numerous graduates of the Centre continue to 
be active in research and teaching in the member 
states of the East African Community. They deepen 
their legal competencies in the field of regional in-
tegration and act as multipliers by passing on their 
knowledge to the next generations of students. 
Joint networking is a model for living integration: 
The exchange of experiences between students 
helps to familiarise them with the different legal 
systems of the EAC member states, and with inter-
cultural differences within the region. The contacts 
established in the process remain in place well 
beyond the one-year joint master‘s programme. 
Sustainable cross-border cooperation has thus 
emerged in recent years. This was also reflected in 
two alumni conferences, which the Centre hosted 
in 2018. The large number of professional positions 
in which TGCL graduates today hold responsibilities 
in government, business, and civil society was im-
pressively demonstrated here.
Future prospects
When the TGCL was founded in 2008, it was one 
of five institutions that the Federal Foreign Office 
supported via the DAAD within the framework of 
the „Aktion Afrika – Fachzentren zur Eliteförderung“ 
(Action Africa – Centres of Excellence). In line with 
the concept of „Action Africa“, the programme and 
structure of the TGCL were designed for sustainabi-
lity from the outset. The integration into the Univer-
sity of Dar es Salaam School of Law will guarantee 
that in the future, under the full direction of the 
School of Law, the TGCL will further develop and 
expand its role as a centre for excellence in law. It 
will continue to support and promote regional in-
tegration within the East African Community with 
its legal expertise. Interdisciplinarity is to be given 
greater prominence here than in the past. Having 
already established regular seminars on economic 
fundamentals in the study programme, interdisci-
plinary teaching and research activities in political 
science, economics, and law are to be further inten-
sified.
The lively scientific exchange that has developed 
between the Faculty of Law of the University of Dar 
es Salaam and the Faculty of Law, Business and Eco-
nomics of the University of Bayreuth also forms the 
basis for research projects that will be promoted in 
the coming years under the umbrella of the Africa 
Multiple Cluster of Excellence. For example, the pro-
Fig. 1: Students of the TGCL in front of the 
Weston Building, where the School of Law is located 
on the campus of the University of Dar es Salaam 
(Photo: TGCL).
„The comparison between the integration processes in 
East Africa and in Europe is of great interest to both sides.“
„In essence, TGCL is concerned with the excellence 
of EAC law. I hope that the resulting research will 
show the member states of the East African Com-
munity how the difficulties associated with legal 
integration can be alleviated.“
Dr. Denis Bikesha (TGCL Alumnus 2012-15), 
Ag. Dean, University of Rwanda School of Law
„Studying at TGCL has been one of the highlights 
of my career so far. Not only have I made lifelong 
contacts, but I have also gained in-depth access 
to the theory and practice of regional integration 
through research excursions in the East African 
Community and the European Union.“
Emmanuel Sebijo, LLM 
(TGCL Alumnus 2016/17), founder and research 
associate, Centre for Law, Economics and Policy 
on East African Integration, Kampala, Uganda
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ject „Human Rights, Corporate Social Responsibility, 
and Interacting Markets in Africa“ will address hu-
man rights and corporate responsibility in the con-
text of African regional economic communities. The 
focus here is on collective human rights, which can 
be seen as a peculiarity in the African context. Sev-
eral African countries have recently enacted laws 
that prescribe corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
This practice seems to contradict the „Western“ 
view of CSR as a voluntary commitment; however, 
this view is also undergoing a process of change. 
For this reason, the overlap between human rights 
granted by the state and social responsibility taken 
over by companies will be examined more closely, 
particularly in the areas of the environment, renew-
able energies, and climate change in interacting 
regional markets. In these analyses, the effects of 
the multi-layered relationships between state and 
non-state actors also play a major role, which in 
turn are influenced by the legal framework.
In the future, this and other planned projects will 
further deepen the successful research coopera-
tion that the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern 
African Legal Studies has initiated as a cooperation 
project of the Universities of Bayreuth and Dar es 
Salaam.
Fig. 3: The TGCL students of the year 2018/2019 
(Photo: TGCL).
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Fig. 2 (upper right): International exchange in the 
work rooms of the TGCL (Photo: TGCL).
„The regional integration of countries is similar to 
the interdependence of people with one another. It 
is crucial that the participating countries benefit 
from each other’s economic advantages.“






Shopping bags and baskets made of natural materials, as here in 
Kenya, are increasingly replacing the formerly popular but environ-




in the states of the 
East African Community
Law & Politics
23Issue 2 . 2019
he member states of the East African Com-
munity react with increasing attention and 
concern to the health and environmental conse-
quences of using disposable plastic goods.  Rwan-
da led the way by introducing a partial ban on such 
goods as early as 2008. Hon. Patricia Hajabakiga 
from Rwanda, a member of the East African Legis-
lative Assembly (EALA), took the first transnational 
initiative in 2011: She introduced a bill in this legis-
lative body on the EAC-wide control of polyether 
materials. However, this project ultimately failed 
due to objections from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanza-
nia, where a decline in investment was feared. The 
same fate befell another bill, which was introduced 
in the EALA by the same MP in 2016, but has not 
been passed to this day. Thus, it remains up to the 
individual EAC member states to monitor and re-
duce the environmental and health impacts of plas-
tics through their respective national legislation. As 
a result, there are significant differences within the 
EAC, both in terms of legislation and enforcement. 
These become particularly evident in the use of 
plastic bags in people‘s everyday lives.
Rwanda
The small East African country Rwanda has devel-
oped into a role model in many respects. Its achie-
vements in environmental protection have gained 
worldwide attention – and they are indeed remark-
able. Today, Rwanda is seen as a pioneer of sustain-
able environmental policy. Indeed, it was the first 
EAC member country to implement a permanent 
ban on plastic bags.
In 2000, the Rwandan government published „Visi-
on 2020“, which gave high priority to environmen-
tal protection. Following on from this, the Univer-
sity of Rwanda, in collaboration with the Rwanda 
Environment Management Authority of Rwanda 
(REMA), developed a scientific study that showed 
the serious side effects of widespread use of plastic 
bags. Because a reliable system for recycling plastic 
bags could not be implemented in a timely manner, 
the government decided to ban them through Law 
No. 57/2008 of 10 September 2008 which prohibit-
ed the production, import, use, and sale of polythe-
ne plastic bags in Rwanda.
This ban was implemented in two stages. In the 
first few years, government measures focused on 
raising public awareness of the harmful effects of 
plastic in the environment, and on bringing about a 
sea change in awareness. Only then did the govern-
ment introduce sanctions and state controls. Vio-
lations of the ban on plastic bags were punishable 
by prison sentences of between six and twelve 
months, or fines of €100 - 500. As a result of the 
comprehensive ban and its rigorous enforcement, 
the Rwandan capital of Kigali is now one of the 
cleanest cities in Africa. This new-found image has 
contributed to the trend of more and more tourists 
visiting Rwanda – visible proof that the actions of 
legislators and government are having an effect.
But Rwanda‘s commitment to protecting the envi-
ronment did not stop at banning plastic bags. It has 
recently reached another milestone on the road to 
better protection of the environment and health 
through the adoption of Law No. 17/2019 of 10 Au-
gust 2019 relating to the prohibition of manufactur- 
ing, importation, use and sale not only of plastic 
carry bags but also of any single-use plastic items. 
T
    Fig. 1: Founded in 2000, the East African Community (EAC) comprises the founding states Kenya, Tanzania and  
Uganda as well as their neighbouring states Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. There is already a common market;  
in the long term, a monetary union and the creation of a federal market are to be established (Illustration: Michael  
Wegener / Julia Blauhut).
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The law entered into force on 23 September with 
the publication in the official gazette and replaced 
Law No. 57/2008. Apart from the much wider scope 
of the new law – including any single-use plastic 
items – it also introduces severe sanctions towards 
any kind of violation of its provisions. For instance, 
in the case of manufacturing of the above-menti-
oned items, apart from dispossession of the items, 
an administrative fine equivalent to € 9,700 is due 
whereas their importation is liable to their dispos-
session and an administrative fine equivalent to ten 
times of their value. 
Critical observers have pointed out, however, that 
these successes would not have been possible with- 
out the decidedly authoritarian style of govern-
ment prevalent in Rwanda. 
Kenya
It‘s a sunny Saturday in late June 2019 in Nairobi. 
The supermarkets are overcrowded with customers 
intent on replenishing their stocks of food and daily 
commodities for the next month. The attentive ob-
server won‘t fail to notice that most shoppers are 
carrying eco-friendly fabric bags, baskets and re- 
usable synthetic bags bearing colourful logos. 
There is no trace of the infamous plastic bags that 
otherwise appear scattered all over Kenya.
This turnaround would have been unthinkable just 
one and a half years ago, when supermarkets in 
Kenya supplied their customers with tons of free 
plastic bags. It is estimated that before the plastic 
bag ban, up to 86,000 plastic bags were distributed 
daily in Nairobi alone, while 24 million plastic bags 
were consumed nationwide each month. Because 
Fig. 2: View of the Rwandan capital Kigali  
(Photo: Flickr / Adrien K. / CC BY 2.0).
Fig. 3: Alternative durable shopping bags in a 
supermarket in the Kenyan capital Nairobi (Photo: 
Omondo Robert Owino).
„It remains up to the individual member states of the East African 
Community to monitor and reduce the environmental and health 
impacts of plastics through their respective national legislation.”
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supermarkets didn‘t charge extra for the bags, it 
was more convenient to throw them away care-
lessly instead of reusing them. This resulted in seri-
ous environmental damage in most major Kenyan 
cities, and even in rural areas. Plastic bags spoiled 
the landscape in most areas. They accumulated on 
landfills, blocked sewers and got into the food of 
farm animals. They provided breeding sites for ma-
laria-transmitting parasites, besides polluting rivers 
and damaging marine life.
On 14 March 2017, the Kenyan government inter-
vened: According to  Gazette Notice No. 2334, not 
only the manufacture and import of plastic bags 
was banned on the basis of the Environmental Man- 
agement and Coordination Act, which provides 
the legal framework for the Kenyan plastics ban, 
but also their use as packaging materials in private 
households and commerce.
The Kenya Association of Manufacturers, however, 
took the case to court, arguing, among other things, 
that the ban would impose unnecessary social and 
economic costs on the population. In addition, they 
claimed the ban was doomed to failure, anyway, 
judging by the fate of similar initiatives in other 
countries. The Environment and Land Court in Nai-
robi, however, was not to be deterred. On 6 June 
2018, it reiterated its view that the ban on plastic 
bags served the common good. The legislature im-
posed tough sanctions to enforce the ban: Anyone 
who is caught manufacturing, selling, or using bags 
or other prohibited objects made of plastic must 
expect a prison sentence of up to four years or a 
fine of €17,000 - 34,000.
Technophile critics have come down hard on Kenya 
for this rigorous approach. But in view of the fact 
that industrial recycling of plastic waste in Kenya 
is sorely underdeveloped, and modern recycling 
technologies remain lacking by and large, an un-
conditional prohibition on plastic bags is currently 
the only sensible option.
Tanzania
Plastic bags – anyone can carry them, at any time, 
and virtually any everyday object can be carried 
in them. In Tanzania, the plastic bag is still called 
„Rambo“ today, like the world-famous film charac-
ter who was pictured on many of these bags in the 
mid-1990s. At the time, the plastic bag had driven 
all other types of carrier bags out of the market. It 
became customary not only to transport clothes, 
medicines or schoolbooks in these bags, but even 
to pack food such as French fries in them. It is esti-
mated that between twelve and 15 plastic bags 
were needed for everyday purchases of food such 
as fruit and vegetables. They were cheaper, and 
almost everyone could afford them. Baskets and 
paper bags, on the other hand, were considered in-
efficient, short-lived and more expensive from the 
early 1990s to the early 2000s.
    Fig. 5: Sale of alternative carrier bags and  
baskets on Zanzibar (Photo: Denis Zagoskin / 
Shutterstock.com).
Fig. 4: The spread of plastic waste in the proxi-
mity of residential areas, as here in Kenya, led to 
the rigorous legal ban on plastic bags (Photo: Luvin 
Yash / Shutterstock.com).
Recommended reading
P. Behuria: The comparative poli-
tical economy of plastic bag bans 
in East Africa: why implementati-
on has varied in Rwanda, Kenya 
and Uganda. GDI Working Paper 




26 Issue 2 . 2019
In light of the harmful effects on the environment 
and health, this „customer‘s best friend“ proved to 
be a wolf in sheep‘s clothing. Because recycling 
facilities and efficient waste disposal were lacking, 
the flood of plastic bags developed into a universal 
threat that – among other harmful effects – clogged 
urban sewage systems. In view of these problems, 
the governments of mainland Tanzania and Zanzi-
bar responded with legal measures against the pro-
duction and use of plastic bags.
However, the regulations issued in 2006 and 2015 
for mainland Tanzania were a failure because they 
contained only limited bans. On 1 June 2019, the 
new Environment Management (Prohibition of 
Plastic Carrier Bags) Regulations came into force. 
They completely banned the manufacture, distri-
bution, import, and use of plastic bags, and pro-
vided incentives for the use of alternatives. In the 
same spirit, the 2009 and 2011 regulations for Zan-
zibar had already been replaced in 2018 by the Ban 
on Plastic Carry Bags Regulations, which are still in 
force today.
The enforcement of mainland Tanzanian regulati-
ons involves institutions such as the police, the im-
migration authorities, the Tanzanian tax authorities, 
environmental inspectors, and local regulatory au-
thorities. The latter, in particular, are obliged to im-
plement programmes in support of the plastic bag 
ban with the aim of increasing public information 
and awareness.  In addition, a number of sanctions 
have been imposed in support of the ban. For ex-
ample, a manufacturer in mainland Tanzania who 
violates the ban on plastic bags may face a fine of 
up to €395,000, or a prison sentence of two years 
or more. In general, the population in both parts 
of Tanzania has adhered to the ban on plastics. The 
environment has become cleaner!  Hard sanctions 
are not just provided for in law, they are actually 
implemented. For example, in May 2019, 621 kilo-
grams of plastic bags were confiscated on Zanzibar 
and 149 people were arrested.
Nevertheless, there are mixed feelings among the 
population. On the one hand, the positive effects of 
the ban on plastics for both the environment and 
people are unmistakable. For example, the ban on 
Zanzibar opens up new markets for alternative car-
rier bags produced in the country. Plastic bags, in 
contrast, are imported goods. On the other hand, 
there are complaints that the cost of living has risen 
as a result of the ban, because alternative bags are 
up to ten times more expensive than plastic bags. 
While a plastic bag costs the equivalent of four 
cents, an alternative bag of the same size is sold for 
40 cents.  However, it is expected that financial and 
economic incentives instituted politically will make 
the production and import of alternative bags 
cheaper, and thus lower their selling price. It cer-
tainly doesn’t help that the alternative carrier bags 
currently available are said to be of poor quality. 
The Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) sees this as 
only a temporary problem, and is urging manufac-
turers to comply with the standards recognised by 
the TBS. 
The debates about the inflated cost and poor 
quality of alternative bags and packaging are an 
indication that the government did not sufficiently 
prepare the country’s manufacturers for the plas-
tic ban. Again, the departure from the popular but 
dangerous plastic bags and the resulting long-term 
benefits do have their price.
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Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan
In Uganda there were strong endeavours to ban 
plastic bags completely, just like in Kenya. But 
numerous attempts have failed in the hands of a 
government that half-heartedly stopped short of a 
complete ban. In fact, over the past twelve years, 
legislators have repeatedly banned plastic bags, 
most recently in the 2009 Finance Act. But the 
necessary political will to enforce such bans has 
repeatedly been lacking, especially when met with 
resistance from plastic bag manufacturers. As a 
result, the cultural transition to a society without 
plastic bags is still pending.
Meanwhile, Burundi recently followed in Rwanda‘s 
footsteps: In August 2018, a presidential decree 
came into force prohibiting the import, manufac-
ture, marketing, and use of bags and other plastic 
packaging. The aim was to promote the produc-
tion of alternative packaging – such as biodegrad-
able sacks and bags – and their use in private 
households, trade, and various sectors of industry. 
The state ban allowed for reasonable exemptions: 
The use of plastics is still permitted in the field of 
medical services, for the packaging of pharmaceu-
ticals or industrial goods, as material for sewage 
pipes, in the construction industry, and for research 
and teaching purposes.
In contrast to the legislation in Rwanda, however, 
the decree does not contain any clear provisions 
regarding its implementation. There are still some 
hurdles to overcome in this respect. The decree re-
quires that plastic bottles and other plastic waste 
be returned to the dealers, who in turn must ensure 
the storage, recycling or valorisation of the waste. 
It is doubtful that this can be achieved, given that 
there are still no recycling facilities in Burundi.  This 
is probably one of the reasons why the decree has 
not led to any significant changes in everyday life. 
But it is still too early for a final assessment. The pe-
riod of grace expires on 7 February 2020. By then, 
private households, traders, and companies are ex-
pected to be able to comply with the decree.
Finally, in South Sudan, the newest member state 
of the EAC, plastic bags are mainly imported from 
Uganda, but also from Sudan and Kenya. They are 
mainly used in large cities like Juba, where it is not 
uncommon for scattered plastic bags to pollute 
the environment. Thankfully, rural areas have so far 
been spared. Therefore, it seems that plastic carrier 
bags in South Sudan, unlike in the other EAC states, 
have not become a countrywide problem so far.
The South Sudan Ministry for the Environment and 
Forestry allegedly banned the import and use of 
plastic bags in 2015. But no decree or other legis-
lative instrument to bring about such a ban can be 
verified. The legal basis for the alleged ban is un-
clear. It was not until 2015 that Parliament approved 
the 2015-2025 National Environment Policy – until 
then there had been no clear, reliably documented 
environmental policy in South Sudan. This was not 
least due to the protracted, sometimes civil war-like 
conflicts that stood in the way of the development 
of a solid, legally sound environmental policy. If it 
is true that a ban on plastic bags has actually come 
into force, it could be said that to some extent it is 
a preventive measure in order to prevent a flooding 
of the country with plastic waste.
Fig. 6: The Ham Shopping Mall in Makerere, a district of the 
Ugandan capital Kampala (Photo: Andreas Marquardt / Shutter-
stock.com).
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Poster advertising in the presidential election 
campaign in Ghana. (Photo: Fortune Agbele).
Africa’s presidents in competition 
Election losers as object of democratization research
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emocracy as a model of governance is all too 
often linked to the politics of the West. Scep-
ticism about its transferability to non-Western so-
cieties remains strong. For many years, the relevant 
specialist literature has endeavoured to emphasise 
and explain the different paths of development, 
and the differentiation of forms of rule in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. Yet this does not always pe-
netrate into the prevailing social, political, or even 
scientific discourses.
For comparative research into democratization, a 
look at the 55 states of Africa is tantalizing indeed.1 
Even since the days of political independence, the 
continent has had a wide variety of different stories 
to tell. More recently, Nigeria and Ghana, for ex-
ample, have made positive headlines because their 
presidents have had to admit defeat in democratic 
contests. Botswana and Mauritius have been ruled 
democratically since the 1960s. Benin and Cape 
Verde 2 are examples of democratic consolidation 
following the epochal wave of democratization in 
the early 1990s.
Elsewhere, attempts at democratization triggered 
by this wave have led to a surprisingly persistent 
grey area between democracy and autocracy, for 
example in Kenya or Zambia. In some states, such 
as the Central African Republic, they have collapsed 
completely. Cameroon and Rwanda, on the other 
hand, have, like other states, only taken superficial 
steps towards democratization: Although such pro-
cedures were anchored in constitutional law and 
multi-party elections were formally introduced, 
these measures have not woken any „democratic 
spirit“ capable of shaping public life or the behav-
iour of political leaders. Hence, national elections in 
which different political groups are allowed to par-
ticipate may be a necessary indicator, but are by no 
means sufficient proof of democratic rule. Eritrea 
and the Kingdom of Eswatini are currently the only 
African states to de jure waive national multiparty 
elections.
 
Selected centres of power
However, as a necessary element of democracy, 
electoral contests deserve special attention. Pre-
sidential elections deservedly attract the greatest 
public and scientific attention. On the African conti-
nent, there are predominantly presidential systems 
of government that have a directly elected head of 
state who cannot be deposed for political reasons, 
and who has direct power to govern. Some govern-
ment systems in Africa can also be described as 
semi-presidential because a prime minister formally 
heads the government. Yet even in these cases, 
African presidents overwhelmingly enjoy much 
greater power than the prototypical US president 
or the French president.
African presidents are not all equally powerful, but 
formally and informally they are typically more pow- 
erful than most other elected executive leaders in 
the world. This power often goes hand in hand with 
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Number of elections in which incumbents 
stood for re-election
Number of all presidential elections
Percentage of presidential defeats in 
all elections
Percentage of presidential defeats in 
elections for which the incumbent ran
Percentage of elections in which a 
limitation on terms of oce was respected
Fig. 1: African presidential elections with at least 
two candidates from 1990 to 2018 (n=195), blue = 
respect for term limits (n=23), red = incumbent‘s 
election defeat (n=23), green = incumbent‘s 
re-election (n=122), grey = other cases (author‘s 
presentation using www.iconarchive.com). 
Fig. 2: Economic cycle of electoral defeats of 
incumbent presidents compared to the effectiveness 
of term limits (data basis: AfriPrElDa 4.2).
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strong personalization and a weakening of the role 
of political parties. On the one hand, strong presi-
dents are regarded as anchors of stability in many 
places. On the other hand, the constitutional legis-
lators of many countries have tried to throw out a 
lifeline against excessive presidential power at the 
same time: They have limited the maximum term 
of office of presidents, usually to two terms. Since 
1990, there have been constitutional limitations on 
the terms of office in 38 African states.3 There is a 
lively debate in the literature about the effective-
ness of these regulations.
Elections are lost in democracies
Between 1990 and 2018, 195 presidential elections 
were held in sub-Saharan Africa. In 122 of these 
elections, incumbents were re-elected. In 23 cases, 
i.e. about every ninth election, incumbent presi-
dents respected a ban on re-election. So the lifeline 
held. In at least 15 cases, the incumbents manag-
ed to push through a constitutional amendment 
in time to allow them to be re-elected.4 On closer 
inspection, however, one might question critically 
whether an incumbent’s respect for limitations to 
their term of office is generally suitable as an indica-
tor for progress in democratization. In ten of the 23 
cases, respect for term limits has opened the door 
to succession from within the ruling party. Tanzania 
has provided three such instances. There are there-
fore many indications that well-organized predomi-
nant parties with a limited will to democratize can 
not only afford to respect the limitations of their 
terms of office, but can also use them as a source 
of legitimacy.
Another interesting statistic has been largely over-
looked in the research so far: In another 23 cases 
between 1990 and 2018, incumbent presidents 
lost an election and accepted defeat. Here, peace-
ful changes of government resulted. The potential 
significance of these cases was expressed in a sim-
ple formula by the renowned democracy research-
er Adam Przeworski: „Democracy is a system of 
government in which parties lose elections.“ 5 In 
presidential government systems, it is all the more 
true that the democratic character of rule manifests 
itself in the electorate exercising its right to vote out 
incumbent presidents. One can argue conclusively 
as follows: The peaceful change of power based on 
an immediate election decision corresponds to the 
appropriation of democratic opportunities by the 
electorate; while on the other hand, the limitation of 
term of office forestalls an electorate forcing the im-
plementation of democratic changes of government.
Increase in presidential defeats
It therefore seems obvious that presidential defeats 
signify a gain for democratization. However, even 
in these 23 cases it is worth taking a closer look. 
In fact, the field of election losers can be divided 
according to which of the last three decades they 
belong: In the 1990s, former autocrats in particular, 
who were presidents in office but had not come to 
power through pluralistic elections, were defeated. 
Among them were such illustrious names as Ken-
neth Kaunda, President of Zambia, and Mathieu Ké-
rékou, President of Benin. Both had overestimated 
their chances of succeeding in a democratic ballot. 
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D. M. Tull, C. Simons: The Institu-
tionalisation of Power Revisited: 
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„Since 2010, the number of actively voted out presidents 
has risen sharply. Indeed, every fifth president standing 
for re-election has been defeated by a competitor.“
    Fig. 3: Map of Africa 
re multi-party elections 
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dents was rare. The effectiveness of term limits was 
critical for regime change.
Since 2010, the number of actively voted out presi-
dents has risen sharply. Indeed, every fifth presi-
dent standing for re-election has been defeated by 
a competitor. In contrast to the 1990s, these were 
people who had themselves come to power via the 
ballot box – with the exception of the President of 
Gambia, Yayah Jammeh. He accepted his defeat in 
2016 only after massive international pressure – es-
pecially from the West African Community of States 
ECOWAS.
The President of Côte d‘Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, 
who was elected in 2000, did not go to the polls 
for ten years, ostensibly because of the violent con-
flict in his country, until he was voted out of office 
in 2010. The outcome of the election was highly 
controversial due to the dubious behaviour of all 
concerned, including the National Electoral Com-
mission and the Constitutional Court responsible 
for announcing the results. Deep mistrust among 
the political competitors did not allow for an ami-
cable solution. Gbagbo did not accept defeat and, 
with the support of France, the United States, the 
European Union, and the United Nations, had to be 
forcibly expelled from office. The removal of Manu-
el Pinto da Costa from office in the island state of 
São Tomé and Príncipe in 2016 also remains contro-
versial. The incumbent complained of alleged fraud 
and boycotted the run-off election, but ultimately 
did not block the takeover of power by his elected 
successor.
Somaliland also offers a remarkable example of a 
presidential election defeat: President Dahir Kahin 
lost office in 2010. It is doubtful, however, that his 
voting out reflects any seizing of democratic oppor-
tunities by the electorate. In fact, the powerful clans 
in Somaliland had agreed on a rotational procedure 
to fill the presidential office, which ruled out a re-
election of the incumbent. Dahir Kahin „had to“ lose.
In a number of countries, the sometimes close and 
sometimes unforeseen voting out of presidents can 
be seen as an indication that democratic procedures 
have been consolidated, and that the electorate is 
making confident use of its democratic opportuni-
ties. This is true, observers largely agree, at least for 
the defeats of presidents in Zambia (Rupiah Banda, 
2011), Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade, 2012), Malawi 
(Joyce Banda, 2014), Nigeria (Goodluck Jonathan, 
2015), and Ghana (John Mahama, 2017).
In view of this broad spectrum of different develop-
ments, researchers should not allow themselves to 
be distracted in trying to explain the phenomenon 
of „presidential deselection“ in Africa in general. 
This temptation is particularly great for quanti- 
tative comparative research, since it is an easily 
measurable event – just like compliance with or 
disregard for term limits, by the way. It would be 
better to ask when presidential defeats can actually 
act as aids to democratization. At least none of the 
explanations for the voting out of John Mahama in 
Ghana 6 seem likely to lead to a generally applicable 
theory. More recently, African presidents have lost 
elections even in countries where there has been 
little experience of peaceful transition, where there 
has been no open political atmosphere, and where 
the incumbent president could not have been 
blamed for an economic slump.
Conclusion
It is noteworthy that the new trend of presidential 
defeats in Africa is opening up an interesting field 
of research. At first glance, the electoral expulsion 
of incumbent presidents appears to be a better 
indicator of gains in democracy than the much-
discussed existence of and compliance with consti-
tutional limitations on terms of office. However, any 
euphoria needs to be reined in. The observed elec-
tion defeats of the current decade tell very different 
stories as we near its end, ones which can only be 
properly classified through precise case studies and 
systematic comparative research.
Fig. 4: Kenneth David Kaunda, Zambia‘s first president, 
served from 1964 until he was voted out of office in 1991 
(Photo: wikimedia commons / William M. Firaneck).
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Fig. 5: Muhammad Buhari, President of Nigeria, won the 
2015 presidential election against the incumbent Jonathan 
Goodluck. From 1983 to 1985, after a military coup, he had 
already been head of state of his country once before (Photo: 
wikimedia commons / Chatham House).
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ocal reconciliation is among the most important 
aspects underlying settlement and conflict re-
solution processes within communities, and usually 
adopts a traditional form through traditional actors 
such as traditional leaders, tribal elders, tribe mem-
bers, notables or wise men. The mechanisms adopt-
ed by these reconciliation processes depend largely 
upon local customs, and whether or not they are soci-
ally accepted as an alternative to adjudicating dispu-
ted matters. Customs derive their strength from their 
inherited social appreciation, meaning and respect, 
in addition to their moral authority, which strongly 
influences the parties in conflict to not resort to vio-
lence again after they have accepted the result of the 
customary reconciliation process. 
Local reconciliation may be defined as a social pro-
cess that reflects collective efforts at the local com-
munity level. It includes the processes, initiatives, 
and activities of interest to communities involved in 
conflict, aimed at reaching settlements agreed upon 
by the parties in conflict.1 Local reconciliation in Libya 
is one of the most prominent conflict-solving mecha-
nisms at the local level, contributing significantly to 
the alleviation of conflict during different historical 
periods. It has played a big role since the fall of the 
Qadhafi regime in 2011 that left an institutional and 
security vacuum in which tribes and their traditional 
leaders managed to substitute these institutions.
Local reconciliation based on traditional mecha-
nisms, like customs, are among the most prominent 
tools for settling conflicts at the local level in Libya. 
These conflicts have often been tribal, territorial, mur-
der-related, or social, such as marriage and divorce. 
However, after 2011, most of these conflicts were po-
liticized and rekindled as a result of the political divisi-
ons that emerged after the classification of cities and 
tribes into either pro-Qadhafi regime or supportive of 
the February Revolution. These armed conflicts resul-
ted in social schism and displacement that plagued 
many areas. Perhaps the most prominent example of 
this is the Misrata-Tawergha case, where the armed 
conflict and its repercussion after 2011 led to the 
displacement of the citizens of Tawergha to various 
areas in Libya. The Misrata-Tawergha issue is one of 
the most important cases of reconciliation in Libya. 
Resolving it would support the process of community 
and national reconciliation in general.2
An evaluation of local 
reconciliation agreements since 2011
Since 2011, local reconciliations of any conflict have 
taken on a traditional character, carried out through 
committees formed by tribal sheikhs in the region or 
proposed by tribes from outside. Civil society activists 
are sometimes invited to take part in the reconcilia-
tion processes. Conditions and mechanisms are usu-
ally set in order to initiate the settlement of disputes 
at the local level. The results of such settlements of-
ten take the form of crisis management rather than 
genuine reconciliation between the conflicting par-
ties. These initiatives seek to end the violence, estab-
lish cease-fires between the conflicting parties, and 
allow the exchange of prisoners and the wounded. 
They are often temporary demands by all parties. In 
general, many of these agreements are breached, 
and problems soon begin to reappear between the 
conflicting parties because the solutions were not 
radical enough, and no guarantees were made for 
peace to continue between the parties.
The most prominent local reconciliation agreement 
since 2011 has been the document drawn up by the 
L
Fig. 1: The signing of the treaty between Misrata 
and Tawergha in Misrata city, 3 June 2018 (Photo: 
Reprint with kind permission from Emad Shnab, 
one of the members of Misrata youth who witnessed 
the agreement).
This section and certain parts of this 
article are based on in-depth interviews 
with several sheikhs, local tribal leaders, 
civil society members concerned with 
national and local reconciliation issues 
in Libya, who have participated in many 
of the activities related to the process of 
reconciliation at the local and national 
levels.
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Obeidat tribe on the killing of the Libyan army chief 
of staff and two of his comrades who had been kid-
napped by extremist groups. This happened after the 
public prosecutor summoned the former for inter-
rogation at the behest of Chairman of the National 
Transitional Council Mustafa Abdul Jalil. Other pro-
minent agreements include the National Transitional 
Council Convention with the Tuareg Tribes (2011), the 
Toubou and Tuareg Agreement (2014), the Toubou 
and Tuareg Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation 
(2015), the Agreement on Cooperation and Peace-
ful Coexistence between the Qadhadfa and Awlad 
Suleiman Tribes (2016), the Reconciliation Agree-
ment between the Toubou and Awlad Suleiman Tri-
bes (2017), the Misrata-Tawergha Agreement on the 
Return of the Displaced and the Compensation of 
Victims (2016), and the Peace Treaty between Misrata 
and Tawergha (2018), as shown in the table below.3 
Through a general evaluation of the reconciliation 
agreements and an analysis of its terms, the following 
observations can be made:
  Most agreements involved a comprehensive 
and lasting reconciliation between the two parties 
without installing the mechanisms and means to 
achieve this.
  Therefore, many of these agreements were not 
successful in the implementation of their provisions. 
The most prominent example of this is the Misrata-
Tawergha agreement, which has several outstand-
ing obstacles that hinder its implementation. These 
obstacles include the security situation impeding the 
provision of services in the city. The security situation 
is one of the most important obstacles impeding the 
return and stability of the people of Tawergha city, 
which still lacks the basic requirements of life. There-
fore, re-establishing security services and facilitating 
the search for the missing are considered the most 
important conditions for the return of citizens, not to 
mention rehabilitating the city and providing neces-
sary services such as electricity and the maintenance 
of schools.4
  In cases where there was international involve-
ment in the reconciliation processes, reference was 
made to the issue of „reparation” and compensation. 
The agreements generally stipulated that the exter-
nal mediator (namely Italy and Qatar) shall pay the 
amount of compensation to the affected parties. In 
the Libyan-sponsored agreements, the reparation 
and damages were not mentioned except for the 
Misrata-Tawergha agreement and the peace treaty 
between the two cities in June 2018, which empha-
sized the commitment of executive authorities in 
the Libyan state to implement the conditions of the 
agreement signed between the two parties.5
  Absence of strong state institutions and politi-
cal will is the main reason for the failure of many of 
these agreements on the ground, especially since 
the implementation of measures like reparation and 
accountability in particular requires the support of 




Actors Location Sponsored 
El-Obeidat tribe statement July 2011 Statement El-Obeidat Tribe Benghazi
The Obeidat tribe with the support 
of other tribes 
NTC Agreement 2011 Agreement NTC and Tuareg tribes Ghadames Chief of Staff of Libyan Army
Tebu and Tuareg agreement 2014 Agreement Tebu and Tuareg Sabha
The Social Council of Werfala tribes-
Bani Waid and the South
Tebu and Tuareg peace and reconciliation 
agreement (2015)
Agreement Tebu and Tuareg Doha The Government of Qatar
Accord of peaceful coexistence agreement be-
tween Qadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes 2016
Agreement 
Qadhadfa and Awlad 
Suleiman Tribes
Sabha
Zintan, Tarhouna and Souq El Juma 
tribes
Tebu and Awlad Suleiman Tribes Agreement 2017 Agreement Tebu and Awlad Suleiman Rome Italian Government




Misrata and Tawergha Misrata
Misrata Municipal Council, UNSMIL; 
and some municipal councils in Libya
„A lack of the State’s role, particularly the security aspect, is one 
of the most important challenges of the reconciliation projects.”
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Chart 1: Overview and key data of 
the agreements in Libya since 2011. 
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Challenges to the 
local reconciliation process
There are a number of challenges facing reconcilia-
tion at the local level in particular and the national 
level in general. Among these challenges are the 
spread of weapons, armed groups, and institutions 
that are parallel to state security institutions, ob-
structing any reconciliation agreements. A lack of 
provision of the State’s role, particularly the securi-
ty aspect, is one of the most important challenges 
of the reconciliation projects because the existence 
of the State and its institutions ensure adherence to 
the provisions of these agreements and contribute 
to their implementation. In addition, putting self-
interest – whether tribal or regional – before the 
national interest is another challenge. Interference 
by external parties, especially if their objectives do 
not serve the reconciliation brief in Libya, is one of 
the most important challenges. The phenomenon 
of vigilante justice is prevalent in some regions and 
cities, as is the absence of a culture of tolerance and 
reconciliation. A lack of material resources to help 
parties communicate and contribute to the reconci-
liation process, and the lack of logistical aspects are 
also among such challenges.
Guarantees for the success 
of local reconciliations
To ensure the success of local reconciliation in Libya, 
emphasis should be placed on moral and ethical 
aspects, including religious restraint, loyalty to the 
homeland, respect for covenants, trust among parties, 
and the genuine desire for peace. There should also be 
a focus on the importance of the State’s role and its in-
stitutions in ensuring a successful implementation of 
various reconciliation initiatives, especially with regard 
to redress and accountability procedures. Among the 
most important guarantees of success is the role that 
national dialogue can play in promoting reconciliation 
at the local and national levels. There should be an em-
phasis on the independence of the parties from any 
external interference or attempts to politicize a case, 
while ensuring that national interests prevail over per-
sonal, regional, and tribal interests. In addition to this, 
there should be Libyan ownership of reconciliation 
projects, both local and national, and reconciliation 
meetings should be held in Libya itself. Other guaran-
tors would be disarmament and non-proliferation of 
weapons, while focusing on promoting a culture of 
tolerance and acceptance of the other, through edu-
cation and information programmes.6
Conclusion
Since 2011, local reconciliation efforts in Libya have 
mostly adopted traditional reconciliation mecha-
nisms. Customary solutions to conflict have played 
a major role. Tribal groups have also contributed to 
the settlement of disputes through the formation of 
reconciliation committees consisting mostly of tra-
ditional leaders. The reasons for accepting these tra-
ditional mechanisms include the local community’s 
acceptance of these traditional mechanisms and 
commitment to customs and the resulting settle-
ments. The State’s weakness since 2011 and the 
absence of its various institutions, especially securi-
ty and judicial establishments in many parts of the 
country, have enhanced the traditional role of tribes 
and their emerging institutions, such as tribal coun-
cils at the local, regional and national levels.
 
One of the most prominent weakness of the local 
reconciliation processes is the absence of women 
from these processes. In fact, it is socially unaccept-
able for women to attend meetings, consultations, 
negotiations, or reconciliation activities, which are 
seen as tasks for men only. Similarly, youth are ab-
sent from local reconciliations, as they are often seen 
as the source of conflict between tribes and families. 
Moreover, reconciliation councils often rely on deci-
sion-makers who are the senior sheikhs. It is there-
fore important to engage youth and women in com-
munity and national reconciliation initiatives, and to 
recognize their role in promoting security and social 
peace. It is also important to establish reconciliation 
committees of young people and women to im- 
prove their capacities to participate in such endea-
vours, including mediation and peace-building skills.
In general, traditional reconciliation efforts can 
contribute to reducing the burden on the judiciary 
system, but do not replace it. There are some issues 
that can only be resolved through the application of 
the law, while other cases can be solved through the 
court with the assistance of conciliation and arbitra-
tion committees, which often consist of traditional 
tribal leaders. Reconciliation processes at the natio-
nal level have not gained much support until now, 
due to lack of supervision and mostly because they 
often require state intervention to achieve justice 
and reparation. Conditions of stability and security, 
but also rules on the protection of victims and wit-
nesses, are also needed for the establishment of a 
Truth Commission and a Missing Persons’ Commis-
sion.
1  Cf. A. S. M. Obeidi (2018), see Recom-
mended Reading.
2  According to the general census of 
the population in Libya in 2006, the 
Tawergha population was about 24,223, 
where Tawergha was part of the city 
of Misrata, among 25 major people’s 
congresses according to the adminis-
trative division during the period of 
Qadhafi rule. According to UNHCR 
reports, 35,000 Tawergha refugees have 
been displaced to various locations 
throughout Libya, of whom 16,000 are 
in the eastern provinces and 12,000 in 
the western region, particularly in Tri-
poli. See also M. Cherif Bassiuni (ed.): 
Libya from Repression to Revolution: 
A Record of Armed Conflict and In-
ternational Law Violation, 2011-2013. 
Leiden 2013, 617-619. 
3  Cf. note 1, 9-14.
4  Bawaba alwasat, http://alwasat.ly/news/
libya/209418. 17 June 2018.
5  Treaty between Misrata and Tawergha 
in Misrata city, 3 June 2018.
6  This section and certain parts of this 
article are based on in-depth interviews 
with several sheikhs, local tribal 
leaders, and civil society members 
concerned with national and local 
reconciliation issues in Libya, who have 
participated in many of the activities 
related to the process of reconciliation 
at the local and national levels.
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of this article is based on published 
papers on Local Reconciliation in Libya 
in T. Hüsken et.al. (eds): The Multiplicity 
of Orders and Practices (Köln 2019), 
UNDP project towards National Recon-




Refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya (Photo: © Brendan Bannon/
IOM/UNHCR). Small picture: Somali refugees in Dadaab, Kenya 
(Photo: Sadik Gulec / Shutterstock.com).
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efugee camps have become a key tool in the 
global management of migration. About a 
quarter of the 65 million refugees worldwide cur-
rently live in a refugee camp. There are now refu-
gee camps the size of cities: The fifth largest city 
in Jordan (Zaatari), the fourth largest city in Kenya 
(Dadaab), and the third largest city in Sierra Leone 
(Gondama) are refugee camps.
The French anthropologist Michel Agier describ-
ed Africa as the „continent of refugee camps in 
the 21st century“.1 While most refugee camps in 
Europe are closed soon after their construction, in 
Africa they often remain in place for long periods. 
Refugee camps in Europe are seen as a temporary 
emergency solution, but when set up in Africa, they 
are often idealised as a magic formula for over- 
coming problems that actually or supposedly result 
from refugee movements. According to Agier, 14 
per cent of refugees in Europe live in a camp, but in 
Africa the figure is around 83 per cent.2
In light of past experience with refugee camps, the 
current trend towards setting up new camps in Af-
rica is a mystery. Here it’s „reception centres“, there 
new „regional disembarkation platforms”, and else-
where again „controlled migration centres“ that are 
set to be established with the support of Interna-
tional Organisations and Western donor countries. 
However, once they are built, refugee camps have 
the tendency to survive longer than originally ex-
pected. In 90 percent of cases, they remain in place 
for more than five years. Some even survive much 
longer. The Meheba Settlement in Zambia will cel-
ebrate its 50th anniversary next year. The Oruchinga 
Settlement in Uganda has been in existence for 58 
years. It is now well documented that living con-
ditions in refugee camps are often catastrophic. 
Camp inmates often suffer from hunger or cholera 
epidemics, or are threatened by attack from armed 
groups.
In some regions, refugee camps are developing into 
such urgent challenges for internal security that the 
respective states would like to see them disappear 
– for example in Kenya, where the government has 
repeatedly announced its intention to close the Ka-
kuma and Dadaab camps. Even the United Nations 
Refugee Agency now advocates „alternatives to re-
fugee camps“.3 Instead of setting up new refugee 
camps, the local integration of refugees in villages 
and towns should be supported. But if refugee 
camps are often part of the problem and not part of 
the solution, why are new ones always being built? 
At this point it is worth taking a look at the history 
of the 20th century: the century in which refugee 
camps became the standard solution of global mi-
gration management.
Historical review
When the United Nations Organization was found-
ed in 1945, war had uprooted people on an unpre-
cedented scale: demobilized soldiers, former forced 
labourers, prisoners of war, liberated concentration 
camp prisoners, displaced persons, civilians fleeing 
the Red Army or the Allies, and many more. In Europe 
alone there were about 60 million people on the 
move, and worldwide about 175 million people – 
and this with a world population that was only one 
third as large as it is today.4 Given these figures, it is 
easy to understand why historians are taken aback 
when it is occasionally claimed that there are more 
refugees today than ever before.
Refugee camps were established in the context 
of the Second World War because the Allies saw 
R
Fig. 1: Refugee camp in the Somali capital of 
Mogadishu (Photo: Sadik Gulec / Shutterstock.com).
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„In the colonial mindset, African migrations  
were seen as a pathological phenomenon  
in need of diagnosis and treatment.“
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refugees as a military and strategic problem. They 
were regarded as an unpredictable, disruptive fac-
tor in the control of roads and trains, troop trans-
ports, the distribution of resources, and logistical 
planning. Even before the official founding of the 
United Nations, the Allies established the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) in 1943. This organization, which was sub-
ordinate to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), soon established 
a vast network of refugee camps stretching from 
Egypt through southern Italy to northern Germa-
ny. Refugees were seen on the one hand as victims 
in need of help, who had to be cared for, but on 
the other hand also as a risk. There was talk of the 
risk of „contagion”: Refugees were thought to be a 
source of diseases (cholera, typhus, diarrhoea) and 
dangerous ideas (fascism, national socialism, com-
munism). It was about help, but it was also about 
surveillance.
When the Second World War ended, UNRRA‘s exper-
tise was transferred to new UN agencies: first to the 
International Refugee Organisation (IRO), then from 
1952 to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). These continued the techniques 
of administration and surveillance which merged 
the two functions of refugee management: care 
and control. A large part of the refugee camp vo-
cabulary („refugee camps“, „transit centres“, „wait-
ing zones“) and the legal-sounding categories 
(„refugees“, „stateless persons“, „displaced persons“, 
„exiled intellectuals“, „unaccompanied children“) 
were coined in these post-war years. Soon, how-
ever, responsibility for refugee administration shift-
ed from the UN to the nation states. As early as 
1951, when the UNHCR was founded, it was clear 
that the institution was needed more in an advisory 
capacity than for large-scale logistical projects. The 
lawyers of the UNHCR, which was mainly financed 
by the USA, were meant to keep a close eye on the 
governments of European countries in dealing with 
refugees.
The geopolitical caesura of decolonization open-
ed up new countries for UN organizations: In the 
1950s, eleven countries became independent in the 
Americas, in Asia, and in Africa, and in the 1960s, it 
was 44 – soon to become members of the United 
Nations. The High Commissioner for Refugees re-
cognized new fields of activity for his organization 
in the emerging „Third World“. The division of India 
and Pakistan had already forced millions of people 
to flee in 1948. Now the colonial wars in Algeria and 
Kenya had displaced thousands of civilians. This 
was followed by pogroms in Rwanda and Burundi, 
and military coups in Congo and Togo. The UNHCR 
offered its „good offices“ to the newly founded 
states, but as soon as the UN experts arrived on the 
ground, they were confronted with another traditi-
on of migration management: the colonial legacy.
The legacy of colonialism
Refugee movements were not uncommon in colo-
nial African territories. Many people fled European 
conquests, colonial reprisals, forced recruitment, 
new epidemics, and other threats to life and limb. 
The UNHCR was to learn that colonial officers and 
Fig. 3: The Nyarugusu refugee camp in Tanzania, 
one of the largest refugee camps in the world.  
A large number of people from Burundi have found 
refuge here (Photo: © UNHCR/Dominic Nahr).
Fig. 2: The Moria refugee camp on the Greek 
island of Lesbos. It is designed for 3,000 people,  
but there are currently around 13,000 people  
living here, many of whom have fled from Africa  
(Photo: Nicolas Economou / Shutterstock.com).
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administrators already had a certain preference for 
setting up camps: Already at the beginning of the 
20th century there were concentration camps in the 
South African Boer War, camps for prisoners of war in 
German Southwest Africa, camps for sleeping sick-
ness patients in the Belgian Congo, camps for forced 
labourers in the French Colony of Côte d‘Ivoire, 
camps for miners in Britain’s South African Colonies, 
camps for convicts, opposition members, or mi-
grants in almost all African colonies. The functions of 
the camps were very different – but the colonial ad-
ministrators, officers, doctors, and lawyers had often 
gained experience in several of these institutions. 
They shared certain ideas, certain experiences, and 
certain hopes. Above all, they had one conviction in 
common – and this was soon adopted by their post-
colonial successors and by international organisa-
tions such as the UNHCR: Development requires a 
mobilization and concentration of manpower. 
Migration, temporary migration flows, and no-
madism were therefore regarded as obstacles to 
development. Accordingly, African societies were 
idealized as traditional village communities desta-
bilized by migration. There was talk of „vagrancy“ 
and „de-tribalization“ as causes of backwardness, 
poverty, and crime. The fact that migration was 
a normal part of African social orders was over-
looked: In the colonial mindset, African migrations 
were a pathological phenomenon in need of dia-
gnosis and treatment. The means for this were 
„planning“, „concentration“, „sedentariness“, and 
„discipline“. Spatial planning and organisation were 
expected to overcome obstacles to development, 
in particular low population density, labour short-
ages, and the high cost of social services in sparsely 
populated territories.
Uncontrolled migration was seen as a danger that, 
it was believed, would upset the traditional bal-
ance, divide families and ethnic groups, and lead 
to moral decline. But in some places there was also 
a shortage of labour or farmers to grow products 
desirable to the colonial administration. Labour 
camps offered a solution here: The „stabilisation” of 
the labour force was seen as a prerequisite for so-
cial security and progress. These labour camps and 
state settlement projects were further important 
precursors of later refugee camps. Accordingly, they 
were not seen exclusively as a necessary transition-
al solution, but as a lever for economic growth. In 
refugee camps, like in small laboratories, all the in-
frastructural technology and facilities necessary for 
rural development could be tested and demonstrat-
ed: Irrigation, drainage, road construction, health 
centres, schools. Mobilising work in the camp was 
thus a decisive step towards „modernisation“.
A closer look at the refugee camps in particular 
reveals the extent to which the colonial legacy 
influences our dealing with migration and refu-
gee movements.5 The concept of „technical path 
dependency“, developed in the social and econo-
mic sciences, applies very neatly to the camp in its 
various functions. Since the colonial period, the 
camp has been an ambivalent technique that at 
first glance links opposing functions – that of car-
ing and that of controlling – with one another. It is 
part of a variety of other techniques that use both 
the language of modernization and the language 
of monitoring: Passports, visas, biometrics, border 
posts, drones, remote sensing. The anthropologist 
Katharina Inhetveen describes refugee camps as 
„the predominant form in the world in which refu-
gees are accommodated, administered, and fed.” 6 
Historical scholarship is in a position to fathom out 
how this came to be, and what alternatives were 
neglected along the way: whether unknowingly or 
on purpose.
1  M. Agier: Managing the undesirables: 
Refugee camps and humanitarian 
government, Malden 2011.
2  Ibid.
3  UNHCR: Policy on alternatives to 
camps. 2014
4  P. Gatrell (2013), 3; see Recommended 
reading.
5  This after-effect of the colonial 
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Multiple Cluster of Excellence.
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Fig. 4: The Bulengo refugee camp in DR Congo 




A well in the Farchana UNHCR refugee camp 
in eastern Chad (Photo: Andrea Behrends, 2007).
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Living in uncertainty
Experiences of an anthropologist in the border region of Chad and Sudan
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ver the last two decades you have repeatedly 
travelled in the border region between Sudan 
and Chad, and witnessed the Darfur conflict that 
began in 2003, but also its prehistory. In the mean-
time, these violent clashes have claimed many hun-
dred thousand lives. What are the main reasons for 
this conflict? Who are the actors and what are their 
objectives?
The question is not easy to answer because there 
are multiple historical and political reasons for the 
ongoing conflict in Darfur - especially for the violent 
escalation phase between 2003 and 2010. Ironically, 
the peace talks between the north and south of 
Sudan, which began in 2001 as a result of interna-
tional mediation, were particularly important in the 
outbreak of the conflict. The emerging Power and 
Wealth Sharing Agreement ignored those regions 
of the country that were not directly involved in the 
conflict, but which had also felt severely disadvan-
taged politically and economically for decades. The 
rebel attack in Darfur, in western Sudan in February 
2003 was directed precisely against this discrimi-
nation. The Sudanese government responded by 
shelling Darfur. It supported armed, mounted com-
bat troops who attacked the civilian population, set 
villages on fire, raped and murdered.
The fact that these govern-
ment combat troops, the 
so-called Janjawid, were 
assembled so quickly is 
partly due to the policy 
of land allocation estab- 
lished by the British co-
lonial power, which ruled 
Sudan until the mid-1950s. Certain „ethnic groups“ 
were awarded land by the British, such as the Fur – 
in Arabic „Darfur“ means: „The land of the Fur“. On 
the other hand, the nomadic sections of the popu-
lation, who also lived in the region, were left empty-
handed. With the expansion of the Sahara Desert to 
the south, serious land conflicts between settled 
farmers and cattle breeders have occurred with in-
creasing frequency in recent decades.
The recurrent rivalry between the governments of 
Sudan and Chad is also fuelling the conflict in Dar-
fur, a region far removed from the capitals of both 
countries. Several political upheavals in Chad have 
begun here. In the 1970s, the Arabization policies 
of Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya and Omar al-
Bashir, then President of Sudan, also contributed 
massively to the regional conflicts.
Perspectives of social anthropology
In your research, you investigate the living condi-
tions of people who fled to Chad as a result of the 
conflict across the Sudanese border to the west, and 
who have been living here for decades in some cases. 
How do the questions and methods of social anthro-
pology differ from those of other social sciences, 
such as political science, with regard to the topics of 
„flight“ and „migration“?
Social anthropologists often start from individual 
fates and biographies; they look at the everyday 
practices in the regions they investigate. The fact 
that this research necessarily includes personal 
relationships with the people in the respective 
region is part of the methodological canon of the 
discipline. Social anthropologists try to develop the 
relevance of a topic from the point of view of the 
people they meet locally. Political science, on the 
other hand, often approaches its topics through in-
stitutionalized structures. 
In your experience, which anthropological research 
approaches are particularly revealing when it comes 
to flight and migration in Africa, or regions that are 
often portrayed in the media as African crisis regions?
Social anthropology – 
like other sciences – 
comprises various sub-
areas that often overlap 
in practice. With regard 
to flight and migration 
processes, multi-sited 
social anthropology has 
established itself in recent decades: research that 
starts at several locations simultaneously while 
trying to understand their connections to one 
another. In addition, areas of medical or legal an-
thropology are relevant for research in crisis areas, 
which can complement each other with their diffe-
rent approaches. I would describe myself as a politi-
cal anthropologist with a focus on conflict research. 
That said, one question which interests me greatly 
is that of social effects of resource extraction, such 
as oil or other raw materials.
Research on post-colonialism often calls for a change 
of perspective: Social, economic, and political ques-
tions ought to be described anew from the perspec-
tive of the Global South and approached theoreti-
cally. What does this mean for research into flight 
and migration processes?
O
„No one is ever just a refugee. 
No one is ever just one thing.“
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie 
in a speech to the United Nations (2016)
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In my view, good research is characterised by the 
fact that we work closely with our colleagues in 
the regions we research. In Chad, for example, an 
anthropological research centre, the Centre de Re-
cherche en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines 
(CRASH), has been up and running since 2007, and 
I was involved in its foundation. The Chadian re-
searchers of this centre are now much sought-after 
partners in research cooperations and international 
contract research. They deal, for example, with cur-
rent challenges in areas such as radicalization, cli-
mate change, and infrastructure, or with the effects 
of governance on flight and migration movements. 
Working on subjects like these involves discussing 
the perspectives of local and external researchers 
right from the start of a project, and to incorporating 
them into the research. This approach has always 
worked very well for my research partners and me!
„Participant observation“ plays an important role in 
anthropological research. How has this influenced 
your personal view of events in Chad and Sudan? 
Have you experienced suspicious reactions and re-
servations as a researcher coming „from outside“?
Participant observation means that we, as social 
anthropologists, spend a long time in a place or 
region and experience the everyday life of people. 
In this context I came to know the uncertainties of 
the people in the border area between Chad and 
Sudan very closely. Because of my special position 
as a foreigner, I was able to move back and forth 
between different social strata and groups, unlike 
many locals, and get to know their perspectives. 
This comparative work also makes research a parti-
cular challenge: There are expectations of solidari-
ty on all sides and everyone would want their own 
perspective to be emphasised. The art lies in the 
transparent presentation of the results of analysis, 
into which we also always have to reflect upon our 
own point of view as researchers. Therefore, it has 
become normal and even necessary in our subject 
area to include the author’s perspective in our writ-
ing. 
I have rarely experienced negative reactions to my 
presence. What has happened more often is that 
people have mistaken me for someone providing 
development aid, or they feared that I wanted to 
missionize them. In my experience, however, these 
misunderstandings can always be cleared up quick-
ly, especially with the help of local staff and trans-
lators.
Are there insights in social anthropology that 
should be given more attention by politicians and 
aid organisations when dealing with migrants and 
refugees?
Generally speaking, social anthropology is particu-
larly strong where different perspectives and ways 
of dealing with differences are concerned. The Ni-
gerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has put 
it in a nutshell with regard to refugees: „No one is 
ever just a refugee. No one is ever just one thing.“ 
She speaks here from her own experience and the 
pain it has caused her to be reduced to a single 
category. In this respect, as anthropologists, we can 
provide many relevant insights for the practice of 
working with refugees: facilitating the situation of 
those who have fled – whether on arrival, in making 
a life in a new environment, or with regard to hopes 
and fears for the future. And that means including 
the perspectives of all actors involved!
Living in a refugee camp
Many people who fled from Sudan to Chad now live 
in refugee camps near the national border. What is 
their everyday life like? Are there any fixtures that 
emerge in their daily routine? For example, are there 
jobs with clearly defined responsibilities, or school-
ing for children?
Life in the refugee camps along the Chad-Sudan 
border is comparable to life in artificially over-popu-
Fig. 1: Musa, a long-time resident of the UNHCR 
camp Farchana. When the camp opened in 2003,  
he was „President of the Réfugiés“ for some time  
(Photo: Andrea Behrends, 2011).
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lated villages, where people have little private space 
and poor access to land for agriculture or raising 
cattle. But these were the main occupations of most 
fugitives in the area where I conducted research. 
They often have to walk long distances to find farm-
land that is sufficient for their needs. However, there 
are certainly occupations to pursue in the camps, 
such as teachers, hairdressers, tailors or traders, and 
there are opportunities for training as such. Schools 
also exist in the camps. People’s life situations vary: 
Some are very successful in building up large trade 
networks, while others subsist mainly on the food 
rations of aid organisations. For this reason, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the non-governmental organisations 
working with it run an integration programme that 
categorises the people in the camps according to 
their prosperity and living conditions. Those who 
are better off are increasingly left alone. Only those 
who are regarded as vulnerable – i.e. particularly in 
need of help – will continue to receive support. 
The UNHCR has long intended to withdraw from 
the region. But the people in the camps are strictly 
against this, and fight for the support to continue. 
Although most would rather live independently 
again, they do not yet see any opportunities for this 
because the security situation in their regions of 
origin has not improved.
The Bayreuth historian Joël Glasman points out in 
his contribution to this issue of SPEKTRUM that 
refugee camps on the African continent have a long 
history. Some techniques and structures of their ad-
ministration have survived since the colonial era’s 
prisoner-of-war and labour camps. How aware are 
the people you have met in Chad and Sudan of this 
dimension?
The camp’s inhabitants are certainly not aware of 
historical connections such as those quoted. But 
they can all draw on the experiences of earlier ge-
nerations. For many years, war and displacement 
have been among the things that people in this 
border region have experienced repeatedly. In the 
1980s, for example, refugees moved in the other 
direction, from Chad to Sudan. At the time, a brutal 
war raged on the Chadian side of the border. How-
ever, as both countries were experiencing a severe 
drought at the same time, the aid organisations in 
Sudan had not properly prepared for the long du-
ration of the flight, and it developed into a serious 
famine. Alex de Waal described this situation in a 
publication entitled „Refugees and the creation of 
famine“. He criticizes the aid organizations in the 
strongest terms. They learn from such mistakes – 
and so do the people who flee. With the experience 
of the 1980s in mind, those who were in a position 
to do so decided against moving into the refugee 
camps – even if it made things much harder for 
them for a while.
In recent years, designs for African futures have 
been a focal point of research on Africa in Bayreuth. 
What does the future mean for the people in the 
Chadian-Sudanese border region?
A stable future is hardly an option for people living 
in this area. However, there are variations that de-
pend, for example, on whether someone has com-
pleted a school education and learned a profession. 
Then future prospects for looking after a family are 
often better. Nevertheless, one must always reckon 
with sudden uncertainty that most people here in 
Bayreuth could not imagine in their own lives. A 
Sudanese refugee to Chad once told me that his 
Fig. 2: The Border region of Chad and Sudan 
(Illustration: Jutta Turner / Andreas Gaube).
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decisions for the future could be described as con-
stantly having to choose between losing an arm or 
a leg. Because in all important areas, be it health, 
education, nutrition, or housing, people experience 
extreme shortages. However, some people living in 
this region do relatively well. They often work for 
external aid organisations, for example as contrac-
tors, office clerks, or translators.
Categories of affiliation
What was the focus of your research in recent years?
I have been mainly interested in dealing with war, 
flight, and what some have called „emplacement” 
in this border region, the mutual adaptation of 
newcomers and host populations. By chance, my 
research began several years before the war in Dar-
fur. At that time, I met many different people during 
extended stays in villages and towns of the region, 
and when the war broke out, I was able to study 
their different ways of dealing with uncertainty and 
war. Most impressive for me was the extremely fast 
dissemination of knowledge, and the fact that peo-
ple constantly had to find new ways of dealing with 
crisis.
From a theoretical point of view, I am interested in 
categories of belonging, such as the category of 
„refugee“. The decision if someone is recognized as 
a „refugee“ or excluded from assistance by being 
categorized as a „resident of a war zone”, for a while 
dominates life to such an extent that everyone has 
to deal with it. These processes caught my interest, 
and I admired people‘s creativity very much. During 
my visit in 2007, during the time of the war, those 
who did not move to the refugee camps asked 
me to provide the aid organisations with a list in 
which they had all registered their names and the 
size of their families. With this list, they had created 
evidence of their existence, and on this basis they 
asked for seed to start farming again. By doing that, 
they wanted to rebuild their independent way of 
life. I was very impressed by people’s knowledge 
about how categories have an impact on social life.
Is it not unusual for migrants from Africa arriving 
in European societies to be confronted with defi-
nitive attributions? In Germany, for example, they 
are classified as refugees from war zones, asylum 
seekers, and migrant workers, each with very differ-
ent legal and social consequences.
Yes, every exclusive categorization is a great chal-
lenge. On the one hand, clear-cut attributions are 
useful to reduce complexity and to manage crisis 
quickly. It is mainly about distributing aid fairly or 
granting asylum to those who need it most. On 
the other hand, individuals face the problem that 
Fig. 3: The UNHCR‘s food rations do not provide 
meat, so lucrative meat markets are formed in this 
area, in which the local population also participates 
(Photo: Andrea Behrends, 2011).
Fig. 4: Abdallah used to fight in the war. Since 
he opened the shop in the refugee camp, he and his 
family have been much better off. He has business 
relations in Sudan and Chad (Photo: Andrea 
Behrends, 2011).
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so many other areas of their lives remain hidden, 
which often leaves them desperate. My research 
shows that people never stop trying to cope with 
crisis situations. They try out very different direc-
tions and sometimes they have to make very hard 
decisions. In Germany, people are often forced to 
wait for a long time in uncertain situation; mean-
while their opportunities for personal initiative 
are severely restricted. This contradicts the above-
mentioned creativity, to try out several avenues 
in such situations, and to organize „help themsel-
ves“. Perhaps more opportunities could be created 
here through appropriate support. Social contacts 
in one‘s own environment also have an important 
function. My colleague Julia Bauman did research 
on refugees in Brandenburg: For example, they like 
to help with gardening in their neighbourhood, or 
participate in the local sports club. They want to 
learn the language and show their gratitude for 
being here. Unfortunately, they are often frustrated 
in their willingness to engage; depression or alco-
holism are not rare. Here it would be helpful if the 
people were not just labelled as refugees, but per-
ceived as people with many different abilities and 
interests - just like the quote from Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie‘s says.
Multidimensional research
To come back to the beginning of our conversation: 
On closer inspection, the actors involved in the Dar-
fur conflict, their affiliations and motivations, seem 
to be very complex and do not provide one-dimen-
sional patterns of explanation. Is the Africa Multiple 
Cluster of Excellence, which is programmatically 
oriented towards the key terms „Multiplicity“ and 
„Relationality“, therefore a particularly suitable 
forum to get to the bottom of such complex struc-
tures and processes?
The Cluster has set exactly the right course for 
complex research questions, also in regard to „mi-
gration“ and „flight“. Especially important for me 
is the premise of „doing research with“ instead of 
„researching on“. I also very much like the idea of 
multiplicity – the multiplicity of practices, positions, 
perspectives, and experiences – and their intercon-
nectedness. The first research projects are already 
underway, and more will follow. I am also particu-
larly pleased that the Cluster attaches great impor-
tance to good public communication of research 
results. This could be done using the wide range of 
media available today, from blogs and hypertexts, 
to public discussion forums. Here I see an opportu-
nity, especially for anthropology, to raise its public 
profile.
Fig. 5: Refugees from Darfur in the Iridimi  
refugee camp of Chad. In the background:  
Water tanks to supply the people in the camp  
(Photo: UNHCR / J. Clark).
Fig. 6: Mahamat started off with a cigarette  
stand in 2007, later selling mobile phones and  
telephone credit to international soldiers. Today  
he is a successful businessman in the border area.  
As a native of the region, he has profited from the 




Urban „middle class“ milieus in Africa
On the heterogeneity of future visions in Nairobi
Panoramic view of the Kenyan capital of Nairobi (sst).
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ith the rise of many emerging and develop-
ing countries, economic growth and asso-
ciated changes on the African continent have been 
the subject of renewed interest. Around 2010, in-
ternational media, financial institutions, and devel-
opment organisations discovered middle-income 
groups in African countries that had previously 
received little attention. These groups, located bet-
ween the poor and the rich, were mostly described 
as the „Middle Classes“ in reports and articles. The 
mere existence of these middle income strata in 
Africa caused a worldwide sensation at the time. 
Furthermore, there was speculation as to what 
consequences this would have for future economic 
and political development in Africa. The dominant 
image of a homogeneous underdeveloped conti-
nent in Europe and North America was shaken for-
ever.
Many of the texts formulated by the media and fi-
nancial institutions, however, were based more on 
hopes for economic and social progress (and the 
need for effective headlines) than on well-founded 
analysis of the respective local contexts. The scien-
tific community consequently objected to such in-
admissible generalisations, lack of theory on „midd-
le classes”, and the absence of any link to empirical 
research. Nevertheless, the debate about middle 
income groups made it clear that a significant 
number of people in many regions of Africa enjoy 
considerable opportunities for a consumer lifestyle. 
Since then, research has been increasingly interes-
ted in the question of how peculiarities of African 
contexts and new urban lifestyles influence middle 
income strata in Africa.  A particular difficulty is that 
the concept of the „middle class“ was developed in 
Europe and North America. How do particularities 
like urban-rural relationships, the extended family 
as a household unit, and the significance of ethnic 
groups modify ways of life in Africa?
Since 2013, the Bayreuth Academy of Advanced 
African Studies research project „Middle Classes on 
the Rise“ has been investigating the composition of 
the „middle class“ of an African country using urban 
Kenya as an example. This article summarizes the 
results of a case study from the sociological compo-
nent of the project.1 The starting point of the study 
was the question of whether there is a relatively 
homogeneous middle class in the large cities of 
Kenya that has distinctive characteristics compared 
to upper and lower „classes”. Because the economic 
middle strata of Nairobi and Mombasa have very 
heterogeneous conducts of life, the researchers de-
veloped an empirical research approach to identify 
different milieus, i.e. groups with different ways of 
life.
The main subject of the study were the respective 
future visions of these milieus. The term „future“ 
did not only include individual plans and strate-
gies for advancement, but also, for example, moral 
ideas about the good life and utopias for society 
as a whole. Future visions, for example, can show 
whether members of the middle income stratum 
concentrate primarily on their own progress and 
on the well-being of their nuclear family, or whe-
ther social units such as the wider family or ethnic 
networks are also relevant to them. In addition, the 
study examines to what extent religious convictions, 
humanistic principles, or more practical consid-
erations guide action in the various milieus. This is 
because ideas for the future are also embedded in 
daily consumption and savings behaviour.
„Middle class” milieus:
Future visions in Nairobi
With around three million inhabitants, Nairobi is 
the largest conurbation in Kenya. It is the political 
capital and economic centre of the country. The Ke-
nyan parliament and the government are located 
there. Kenyan industrial enterprises, trading com-
panies, and banks have their headquarters  mostly 
W
Fig. 1: There is no uniform middle 
class in Nairobi. The research distin-
guished six main milieus, but they are 
not clearly separated from each other. 
Many middle income households can 
be assigned to more than one milieu. 
The graph shows also overlaps of these 
milieus (Illustration: Florian Stoll).
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„Most Young Professionals come from privileged families 
and have little reference to their relatives in rural areas.“
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in Nairobi. Many international companies and sev-
eral thousand non-governmental organisations are 
also based here, as is the United Nations Headquar-
ters for Africa. This economic strength, but also its 
urban flair and vibrant night-life, make Nairobi an 
attraction beyond the country itself. This has led 
to a constant influx to and rapid growth of the city, 
which was only founded by the British colonizers 
in the 1880s. Today, 50 to 60 percent of Nairobi‘s 
population live in poverty. One third of those li-
ving in households with one middle-income. In-
deed, even an economic, income-based definition 
of the middle strata is not easy to determine. This 
is shown by the fact that differing amounts of in-
come are used in the research literature to clas-
sify households or individuals as belonging to the 
middle income group. Such definitions appear to 
be objective, but are in fact always influenced by 
subjective assessments 2 In the following, as in the 
Bayreuth case study, all those inhabitants of Nairobi 
who are neither rich nor poor are counted among 
the „middle class“.
Six main milieus can be distinguished within the 
middle income stratum of Nairobi:
   Young Professionals: These are mainly adults 
between the ages of 20 and 35. Characteristic 
of their way of life are a hedonistic-individu-
alistic consumer orientation (clothing, smart-
phones, cars, parties, etc.) and ambitious ca-
reer goals. They usually work in well-paid jobs 
that require a relatively high level of quali-
fication, but some of them are still studying. 
Most of these Young Professionals come from 
privileged families and have very few ties with 
their relatives in rural areas, and a commensu-
rately stronger connection to Nairobi.
   Christian Milieu: This milieu includes all age 
groups. The Commandments and values of 
the Bible, as well as the way their Church inter-
prets the Christian faith, are seen as decisive in 
their own lives. Active participation in Church 
life (Bible study, choir, Church service) and dai-
ly orientation towards Christian norms shape 
their way of life. Typically, their circle of friends 
and business partners also have a strong re-
lation to the Church. At the same time, one‘s 
own life is very strongly oriented towards eco-
nomic success.  
   Cosmopolitan-Liberal Milieu: The members of 
this milieu are committed advocates of civil 
rights and civil liberties. They oppose corrupti-
on and believe that ethnicity should not have 
a dominant influence on politics or society. 
This attitude often goes hand in hand with 
individual career goals. Many of these cosmo-
politan-liberal Nairobi residents work in non-
governmental organisations, or are involved 
in human rights, women groups and environ-
mental initiatives.
   Pragmatic Domestic Milieu: Individual career 
ambitions are rather weak here. It is much 
more important to maintain the standard of 
living of the nuclear family, for which a bal-
ance between consumption and thrift is con-
sidered advisable. One’s own apartment serves 
as a focal point, even in one’s free time. Social 
ties to extended families, churches, and ethnic 
groups are often cultivated, but are not central 
to this way of life.  
In addition, two further milieus are significant in 
Nairobi, which have proven themselves as Neo-
Traditionalists and as Social climbers:
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Fig. 3: The iHub Nairobi, a centre for the young 
high-tech community in the Kenyan capital. (Photo: 
rvdw images / Shutterstock.com).
Fig. 2: Houses of middle income families in 
Nairobi (Photo: Christian Wißler).
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Neo-Traditional Milieu 
Most people in Kenya identify with a regionally 
based ethnic group, of which the four largest are 
Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin. Almost all the in-
habitants of Nairobi have moved from the interior 
of Kenya to the capital. Due to family relationships 
and socio-cultural ties, ethnicity has an emotio-
nal dimension for them. However, the intensity of 
these ethnic references is varyingly pronounced 
among the different milieus. In the Neo-Traditional 
Milieu, relationships with the extended family, the 
home village, and the ethnic group are the guiding 
principles of action. For members of this milieu, it 
goes without saying that they support  relatives, 
whether for training, medical care, or to supple-
ment their income. Joint investments within the ex-
tended family, for example in agricultural projects, 
are also an expression of this solidarity. The identi-
fication with a rural community and references to 
traditions – some of which have only recently been 
established – also influence future visions. Individu-
al goals such as marriage and career are developed 
in consideration of extended family and communi-
ty. Interviews with Neo-Traditionals revealed they 
have a particularly strong sense of responsibility for 
their own community, and a desire to support its 
development.
The Neo-Traditional Milieu comprises several ge-
nerations. It is not limited to the middle income 
stratum, as many poor and some rich people also 
live in networks that have a strong connection to 
extended families and local communities. Com-
munication takes place mainly in the language of 
one‘s own ethnic group. It is a means of everyday 
communication, but can also function as a distin-
guishing mark and medium of ethnic belonging, 
because Neo-Traditionals usually also speak the 
two main languages of Kiswahili and English.
Social Climbers 
The Social Climbers form a milieu that pursues indi-
vidual advancement strategies. Their goal is a better 
life for the nuclear family. They come from modest 
backgrounds, but have already achieved success, 
for example by accumulating savings, completing 
a course of study, or gaining access to a relatively 
well-paid and stable career. This distinguishes them 
from the poor, meaning they belong in the middle-
income group. Climbers achieve their advancement 
through a reduction in consumption, a high savings 
rate, and long working hours. They have also found 
a way to keep payments to relatives at a level that 
does not jeopardise their own progress.
The high savings rate, which can exceed 50 percent 
of the monthly family income in certain phases, 
illustrates the extent to which social climbers are 
geared to the future. For the possibility of a bet-
ter life in the future, they spend little money on 
housing, food, clothing or electrical goods. Con-
sumption is geared strongly towards practical use, 
and owning a smartphone or even a car is part of 
their acquisition strategy rather than for private 
consumption. Self-expression, the short-lived pro-
mise of happiness from luxury goods, and the joy of 
owning beautiful things are all put on the back bur-
ner in this milieu. They minimize all other expenses 
for the sake of having their own business, for a 
university education, or to enable their children to 
attend private school. Even though most „middle 
class” members, when asked, affirm the importance 
of investing in the future, Social Climbers pursue 
their goals more rigorously than members of other 
milieus. Despite these efforts, however, they remain 
highly dependent on economic growth, so their ad-
vancement remains an uncertain project.
The bottom line 
The research on milieus and visions of the future 
in Nairobi offers empirical insights into the hetero-
geneity of the middle income strata and their spe-
cific life realities. In the case study of Kenya‘s capital, 
it was shown that the sociological concept of the 
milieu and the investigation of visions of the future 
form a productive approach to justify the concept 
of the „middle class“, often used without any theo-
retical foundation, and to combine it with empirical 
research into African societies.
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Fig. 4: View of the business centre of Nairobi 
(Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-4.0 / 
Africanmodern).
Fig. 5: Road traffic in Nairobi (Photo: Florian Stoll).
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Empirical results from Uganda
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he International Labour Organization (ILO) 
reported a success in its 2017 report „Global 
Estimates of Child Labour“: Child labour is declining 
worldwide. Nevertheless, around 152 million child-
ren between the ages of five and 17 are still engag-
ed in child labour, almost half of them in Africa. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is worst affected, where on aver- 
age around 20 percent of children have to work.1 
Poverty is often seen as the most important cause 
of child labour. However, this explanation remains 
superficial because „poverty“ is a complex and not 
clearly defined phenomenon. This makes it all the 
more important to identify the underlying causes 
of child labour, because only on this basis can con-
crete political measures be planned and imple-
mented with any chance of success.
Child labour can significantly affect a child‘s well-
being and further development. It often has harm-
ful effects on health, compromises safety, and 
weakens both physical and mental resilience. In 
many cases, it leads to a child having to forego an 
education. As a result, child labour also limits the 
future potential of children to generate income in 
later life. At the same time, the economic and so-
cial development of a country suffers from this im-
pairment of its human capital. As Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate Kailash Satyarthi stresses in his book Every 
Child Matters, child labour can contribute to the 
persistence of poverty, inequality, illiteracy, popu-
lation growth, and other social problems.
Low-income households spend between 40 to 
60 percent of their income on food. Unexpected 
increases in food prices therefore significantly re-
duce disposable income in these households, and 
may have a negative impact on their food security. 
Fig. 1 shows the increase in food prices in Uganda 
between 2008 and 2014. It is noticeable that food 
prices rose significantly faster than the consumer 
price index. This index measures the inflation of 
a representative basket of goods, which includes 
both food and other goods. In fact, a sharp rise in 
food prices was observed worldwide for the same 
period. A Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
report cited the increasing use of agricultural pro-
ducts for the production of fuel as an important 
reason for this. Another factor was the increased 
demand for meat and dairy products in emerging 
markets such as China, but also in developed eco-
nomies. In addition, an increase in extreme weather 
events and speculation could also have driven 
prices up.
Fig. 2 compares directly the proportion of children 
in child labour and the rise in Ugandan food prices. 
While in 2009 about 27.3 percent of Ugandan child-
ren were already working, by 2012 it was as many 
as every third child. The statistical calculations thus 
clearly show that the development of food prices 
correlates with the development of child labour.
But is there a causal effect relationship? In indivi-
dual cases, there is no doubt that many factors 
determine whether higher food prices will lead to 
more child labour: labour market conditions, family 
structure, parent education, and child age. How-
ever, the following considerations speak in favour 
of the assumption of a general causal relationship: 
Poorer households spend a large part of their in-
come on food. Therefore, an increase in food prices 
would not only reduce their disposable income but 
also weaken their food security. This in turn would 
mean that they might resort to child labour to en-
sure that all family members are provided for. It 
should be noted here that in poorer countries such 
as Uganda there are numerous households that 
have a comparatively low incomes but own their 
own land. Consequently, they may use their child-
ren to pursue more intensive farming.
However, the fact that in Uganda – as in other poo-
rer countries in Africa – a relatively large number of 
households are employed in agriculture, one could 
argue against the assumption that inflation in food 
prices will lead to an increase in child labour. Rather, 
these households could benefit from rising prices 
as they generate higher revenues as food produ-
cers. In this respect, they would not necessarily be 
T
Figs 1 and 2: Increase in food prices, consumer 
index, and child labour in Uganda from 2008 to 
2014 (Illustration: R. Frempong, D. Stadelmann 
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Global Estimates of Child Labour: 
Results and trends, 2012-2016. 
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forced to resort to child labour to increase dispos-
able income. At the same time, households that 
own their own land have the possibility of attaining 
a degree of self-sufficiency, so that as consumers 
they are less dependent on more expensive food.
In view of these conflicting considerations, the au-
thors of this article wanted to gain more clarity on the 
extent to which the statistical correlation between 
rising food prices and child labour expresses a causal 
relationship. A joint study, the main results of which 
are summarised below, led to a fairly clear finding.
Frequency and intensity of child labour
The data from the Uganda National Panel Survey is 
highly revealing when it comes to determining the 
number of cases of child labour and their intensi-
ty – i.e. the number of hours worked. These annual 
surveys cover household characteristics, such as 
income, education, and consumer behaviour, and 
also include questions on child labour. Statistical 
analyses of the data thus obtained show a signifi-
cant positive correlation between food prices on 
the one hand and the occurrence and intensity 
of child labour on the other. This relationship be- 
comes apparent even if the analyses use modern 
econometric methods to take into account both 
changing and constant characteristics of indivi-
duals, households, and regions. So what becomes 
clear is: Child labour is higher in the same families 
when food prices rise, and child labour in these 
families decreases again when food prices fall.
The assumption that fluctuations in the frequen-
cy and intensity of child labour are indeed due to 
changes in food prices is confirmed when inter-
national food price trends are taken into account. 
Uganda, with its comparatively low gross agricul-
tural production, hardly influences these prices, 
but is strongly affected by international price 
increases. The impact of international price pres-
sures on local food prices in Uganda can therefore 
be used to assess the causal impact of increased 
food prices on child labour. Once again, it be-
comes clear that the rise in food prices between 
2008 and 2014 was very likely one of the reasons 
for the simultaneous increase in child labour. The 
calculations show how a ten percent increase in 
food prices affected the frequency and intensity 
of child labour:
   Due to the price increase, a child who had 
previously not had to work was required to 
do so with an eight percentage point higher 
probability.
   A child who had already worked had to work 
1.6 hours more per week on average.  
Differences in sex and age 
The proportion of boys in child labour in Uganda is 
higher than that of girls. In addition, child labour is 
more common among older children than among 
younger ones: In Uganda, an average of 26 percent 
of five- to 11-year-old children and 53 percent of 
12- to 14-year-old children have to work. This falls 
far short of ILO standards, which require that chil-
dren between the ages of five and eleven should 
not be involved in work at all. Children aged 12 to 
14 are allowed to do light work, provided it does 
not present health or developmental risks, and 
does not discourage school attendance. Household 
help – such as washing dishes, cooking, caring for 
family members, and similar household activities –
is not part of economic work in the narrower sense 
and therefore not child labour.
The influence of food prices on child labour can be 
differentiated according to the sex and age of the 
children. More expensive food increases the likeli-
hood of having to work, more for boys than for 
girls. At the same time, however, it means that the 
number of working hours increases more for girls 
who already have to work than for boys in the same 
situation. In addition, the analyses show that the 
probability and intensity of child labour as a result 
„The statistical calculations thus clearly show 
that the development of food prices correlates 
with the development of child labour.“
Fig. 3: A boy in Kisoro, Uganda, carries bananas to 
market (Photo: Gudkov Andrey / Shutterstock.com).
Recommended reading
R. B. Frempong, D. Stadelmann: 
The Effect of Food Price Changes 
on Child Labour: Evidence from 
Uganda. The Journal of Devel-
opment Studies (2019), 55 (7), 
1492-1507. DOI:10.1080/002203
88.2018.1448066
Society & Economy 
53Issue 2 . 2019
of more expensive food increases more among ol-
der children than among younger children.
Agriculture is crucial
The results of the study point to a widespread 
household coping strategy: Rising food prices are 
inflation shocks to which households must re-
spond. Parents generally try to avoid their children 
having to work as long as the household income is 
high enough. As soon as they are confronted with 
less favourable economic conditions, they first try 
to generate more income themselves – given, in 
part, that their own productivity is higher than that 
of their children. Only when the household income 
is still insufficient do the children have to work.
Data from the Uganda National Panel Survey shows 
that agricultural activities are the most common 
form of child labour: Between 26 and 34 percent 
of all children worked on family farms in agricul-
ture between 2008 and 2014. The question there-
fore arises whether an increase in food prices will 
have a stronger or weaker impact on child labour 
in those families that are employed in agriculture 
and own land. In order to investigate this in more 
detail, the impact of food prices was analysed in re-
lation to whether a household owns land and does 
or does not engage in agriculture. The results show 
that children are more likely to work in households 
employed in agricultural activity. However, the ef-
fect of higher food prices is smaller if the household 
also owns land. In other words: Land owned by 
farming families protects their children from the 
potential effects of food inflation. This finding con-
firms the assumption that these families can bene-
fit from higher food prices without having to put 
their children to work.
The bottom line
In summary, it can therefore be said that: Food price 
inflation in Uganda between 2008 and 2012 contri-
buted to an increase in both the frequency and in-
tensity of child labour in that country. Households 
owning land were better able to compensate for 
such a price shock, which had a negative impact 
on them as consumers. However, the study also re-
vealed that child labour, especially in agriculture, is 
still highly relevant and widespread. Uganda may 
serve as an example of how rising prices can af-
fect income and child labour in African countries 
that import food. In order to continue the success 
in combating child labour as mentioned by the 
ILO, enormous efforts are therefore necessary. The 
study shows: In addition to generally improving 
growth and development opportunities in poorer 
countries, it is important to ensure that food does 
not become unexpectedly and drastically more 
expensive in these countries, and that households 
have the means to protect themselves more effec-
tively against such inflationary trends.
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    Fig. 4: Children in the surrounding area of Nairobi collect 
firewood for heating and cooking (Photo: Ramiz Allafi / Shutter-
stock.com).
    Fig. 5: A large proportion of children in Uganda work in agricul-
ture. A herd of cattle on the Abuket River in Uganda (sst).
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Residential house of a middle income family in the 
Mumias region, western Kenya (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).
Growing energy consumption 
with increasing well-being?
Household energy consumption in Kenya, Spain, and Germany
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he sufficient and at the same time environ-
mentally compatible supply of humanity with 
energy is undoubtedly one of the most pressing 
socio-political challenges of the 21st century. In 
2015, the United Nations adopted „Agenda 2030 for 
Sustainable Development“, which aims to make the 
global future socially, ecologically, and economi-
cally sustainable. It postulates a total of 17 Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDG), including the goal 
of „affordable and clean energy“. This is particularly 
about „securing access to affordable, reliable, sus-
tainable, and modern energy for all“. Above all, this 
means that the world‘s population should have na-
tionwide access to electricity, and be supplied with 
clean fuels and modern cooking technology.
This places the private household in the focus of 
energy policy and energy industry considerations: 
It is a key unit for the assessment of individual 
wealth and for the realisation of sustainable de-
velopment. Of crucial importance is the access of 
all people to modern household, communications, 
and leisure electronics. Equally important, how-
ever, is the reduction of health risks resulting from 
indoor air pollution in the absence of exhaust air 
systems – for example, when traditional biomass 
(firewood or charcoal) is burned for cooking or 
heating in enclosed spaces.
In general, as a country‘s economic and technolo-
gical development progresses, not only its overall 
national energy consumption but also its per capita 
energy consumption rises sharply. However, what is 
true in this macroeconomic context does not nec-
essarily apply to every single economic sector. This 
is shown by the following studies on the household 
energy sector in Kenya.
Three examples from Kenya
As for most countries of the Global South, provid-
ing households with affordable and clean energy 
throughout the country is a major challenge for Ke-
nya. In recent decades the country has experienced 
a sharp population increase, which will continue in 
the future. However, the annual per capita primary 
energy consumption of 0.5 tonnes of oil equivalent 
(toe) is low by global standards: It is well below the 
global average (2 toe per capita) and thus far below 
the average in the OECD countries (4 toe per capi-
ta). In 2018, around 73 percent of the population 
had access to electricity, compared with only 20 
percent eight years earlier. Nevertheless, more than 
80 percent of households continue to use tradition-
al biomass instead of electricity for cooking.
While per capita energy consumption in Kenya is 
significantly below the global average, a dispropor-
tionately large proportion of energy is consumed 
in the household. On a global average, this share 
is only 21 percent, but in Kenya, it is over 70 per-
cent. The household level is therefore of particular 
importance in the Kenyan energy sector. At first 
glance, it seems obvious that a wealthy household 
with a large number of electrical appliances con-
sumes more energy than a poorer household with a 
smaller number of energy consumers. However, the 
empirical verification of this thesis in households in 
Western Kenya shows that there is no such linear 
relationship between the material well-being of 
a household and per capita energy consumption. 
This is illustrated by the following three examples 
from the western Kenyan town of Mumias and the 
region of the same name.
   In a middle income family household in the town 
of Mumias, annual final energy consumption 
per capita is 0.28 toe, slightly above the Kenyan 
national average (0.22 toe in the household sec-
tor). More than 35 electrical appliances are in 
use in this household. However, cooking is still 
mainly done with firewood and charcoal. LPG 
and electricity are only complementary energy 
sources in this area (fuel stacking).  
T
Urban middle  
income household 
of a family in the 
town of Mumias 
Village household 
of a family 




a small town in the 
Mumias region
Total energy consumption per capita in the household
Final energy (TFC) 0,28 toe 0,29 toe 0,08 toe
Primary energy (TPES) 0,42 toe 0,44 toe 0,10 toe
Energy sources: Consumption per capita in the household
Firewood 550 kg 620 kg 0 kg
Charcoal 55 kg 70 kg 0 kg
Petroleum 0 L / kg 3,3 L / 2,6 kg 30 L / 24 kg
Electricity 228 kWh <1 kWh 192 kWh
Liquified petroleum gas 190 kg 0 kg 28,8 kg
Biomass waste n.a. kg n.a. kg 0 kg
Energy-consuming devices in the household 
Total energy- 
consuming equipment
> 35 > 17 10
Various types of energy-
consuming equipment
20 12 10
Chart 1: The information was obtained by the 
author in the course of seven months of field research 
in the Mumia region of Kenya.
Fig. 1 (above): Traditional hearth in a Kenyan 
household (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).
Fig. 2 (below): Hearth with exhaust air extraction, 
as recommended by the Global Alliance for Clean 
Cookstoves (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).
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   In a similarly family-organized but materially 
much worse off household in the rural out-
skirts of Mumias, the annual per capita energy 
consumption of 0.29 toe is almost at the same 
level. This is surprising as this household has 
no access to the electricity grid and uses only 
half as many energy-consuming devices (17 
instead of over 35). Although electricity con-
sumption is negligible, energy consumption, 
including all energy sources, is no lower than 
in the household of the much wealthier family.
   Indeed, technological change can even go 
hand in hand with a drastic reduction in 
energy consumption at household level. This 
is shown in a third example: In the single 
household of a young woman in the village 
of Nambale, not far from the town of Mumias, 
annual per capita energy consumption is more 
than 70 percent lower than in the other two 
households, at only 0.08 toe. This household 
does not contain many energy-consuming de-
vices either. The basic energy requirement for 
cooking and hot water preparation is covered 
by liquid petroleum gas and petroleum.  
The three example households illustrate a trend 
that energy researchers have also observed in 
other regions of the world: The total energy con-
sumption of a household depends largely on the 
energy sources and technologies used for cooking 
and hot water production. The presence of a larger 
number of large and small electrical appliances 
significantly increases the electricity consumption 
of a household. This is also shown by the example 
of the middle class household in Mumias, where – 
in contrast to the other two households – the fol-
lowing electrical appliances are in operation: TV, 
SAT / TV set, tablet PC, laptop, DVD player, electric 
cooker and refrigerator. Yet even here, the share of 
electrical appliances in total energy consumption is 
relatively low at 23 percent. In the household in the 
rural environment, it is in the negligible range, as 
only small batteries and rechargeable batteries are 
used. Therefore, electricity consumption has no de-
cisive influence on the overall energy consumption 
of a household.
International development programmes are there-
fore working to ensure that new technologies for 
cooking and hot water generation permanently 
increase energy efficiency in households. These in-
novations may also be accompanied by a change 
in the energy sources used (fuel switching). Experi-
ence in different countries shows that households 
with increasing prosperity use different energy 
sources permanently (fuel stacking) and only 
switch completely to electricity and gas consump-
tion at a very high income level. It should also be 
borne in mind that the envisaged switch from solid 
biomass to „cleaner“ energy sources such as electri-
city and liquefied petroleum gas is a switch from – 
at least potentially – climate-neutral and renewable 
raw materials to fossil fuels. As a rule, electricity is 
(still) generated on the basis of fossil raw materials.
Household energy consumption
in Kenya, Spain and Germany
What applies at the micro level to households in 
various social milieus in Western Kenya continues 
at the international level. This is illustrated by a 
comparison of household energy consumption in 
Kenya, one of Africa‘s largest economies, and in two 
OECD countries – Spain and Germany. Total prima-
ry and final energy consumption (TPES and TFC) in 
Spain and Germany is five and eight times higher 
than in Kenya respectively. However, the differences 
are much smaller if we look at the household sector 
instead of the economy as a whole. In the household 
sector, annual per capita energy consumption in 
Spain is only 50 percent above the Kenyan average, 
but in Germany, it is around three times as high. 
This is mainly due to the much colder climate. If the 
energy used for heating in Spain and Germany is 
excluded, the annual energy consumption per capi-
ta is 0.22 toe in Kenya, 0.23 toe in Germany and 0.17 
toe in Spain – roughly the same level. It should be 
stressed that this consistency is only true if all ener-
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„A disproportionately 
large part of the energy is 
consumed in the household.“
Fig. 3: Residential house in the in the rural sur-
roundings of Mumias (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).
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gy sources used in a household, including firewood 
and charcoal, are included in the calculation. Per 
capita electricity consumption in Spain or Germany 
is many times higher than in Kenya, and the availa-
bility of a number of energy sources (energy access) 
in Kenya is often non-existent.
There is no doubt that the general energy demand 
of a country rises sharply as economic development 
progresses. However, although the household is a 
key unit of individual wealth, increasing material 
well-being is not necessarily accompanied by an 
increase in household energy consumption. This 
apparent contradiction dissolves when one distin-
guishes between direct and indirect energy con-
sumption in households. The previous sections of 
this article deal with the direct energy consump-
tion of households or entire nations. Every ener-
gy-consuming device used in the household (TV, 
refrigerator or small electrical appliance) must first 
be produced and thus also causes indirect energy 
consumption. Therefore, when examining the rela-
tionship between energy consumption and wealth 
levels in households, the indirect energy consump-
tion of household appliances should be included in 
per capita energy consumption.
This applies not only at the household level when 
looking at poorer and richer households within a 
country, but also when comparing different coun-
tries. Over the past 20 years, OECD member states 
have managed to maintain or even reduce their 
per capita energy needs as prosperity has increas-
ed. They have achieved this in part because they 
have outsourced energy-intensive production 
chains to China and South East Asia. This happens 
to be where a large part of the household electrical 
appliances later used in other countries is manu-
factured.
Conclusion 
The empirical studies in Kenya have shown by way 
of example that typical household appliances such 
as refrigerators, televisions or other small electrical 
appliances do not drive up energy consumption in 
the household sector per se. They increase electri-
city consumption exponentially, but in the overall 
energy mix of a household these appliances make 
up only a small proportion of the total. If the energy 
used by a household for cooking and hot water can 
be reduced through more efficient use, or can be 
produced locally from existing biomass, the energy 
thus saved can be used for new energy consumers. 
The comparison of Kenya with the OECD countries 
Spain and Germany shows that technologically 
higher quality household equipment is not neces-
sarily accompanied by higher per capita energy 
consumption. Intelligent planning and use of mod-
ern technologies could therefore lead to a higher 
standard of living for large parts of the world‘s 
population without increasing per capita energy 
consumption at the household level.
Fig. 4: Primary and final energy consumption 
(toe per capita and year) in relation to the total 
economy (TPES, TFC), as well as at household level 
(TFC, households) and at household level excluding 
energy for heating (TFC, households excluding 
































TPES TFC TFC, households TFC, households excluding heating energy
Fig. 5: The Mumias region in western Kenya 
(Photo: Manfred Stoppok).
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On a farm in northern Benin, children pound grain while the 





Society & Economy 
59Issue 2 . 2019
hom does a child belong to?“ Most people 
in Germany would probably answer this 
question with „It’s parents, of course“. However, as 
soon as we look beyond our own cultural habits 
and beyond the boundaries of parenthood and fa-
mily, new questions and research approaches open 
up – especially in relation to Africa. On the conti-
nent with the youngest population in the world, 
the majority of the population in most countries 
consists of children actively shaping their environ-
ment. From a social science perspective, childhood 
is not understood as a clearly defined biological 
state, but rather as a socially, culturally, and histori-
cally variable category.
For a better understanding of childhood(s) in Afri-
ca, the term „belonging“ is most revealing. This ge-
nerally refers to the membership of people in „us“ 
groups, such as families, ethnic groups, religious 
communities, or nations, who share a more or less 
pronounced sense of togetherness. The term also 
encompasses the processes and practices that con-
stitute membership in these us-groups. Belonging, 
for example, involves protection and care as well as 
obligations and expectations, such as the expectati-
on to contribute to the reproduction of the commu-
nity. The affiliations of children are not fixed once and 
for all in this view. Rather, they are the subject of soci-
al constructions and negotiations and embedded in 
wider social, economic, legal, and political contexts.
Notions of childhood and childhood-related practi-
ces of living together in African societies are subject 
to rapid change. At the same time, children are cen-
tral to the reproduction of any us-group. Analysing 
the processes of childhood-related affiliations – a 
perspective that goes far beyond pure socialization 
research – opens up new research perspectives and 
insights into processes of social transformation. 




Ideas about the family and kinship affiliation of 
children and about how and with whom children 
should grow up are expressed in various customary, 
religious, national, and international legal norms. In 
the plural legal systems of African societies, they 
overlap, interact dynamically, and change in speci-
fic ways. The following example from Benin in West 
Africa, among others, documents this.
Here it is a widespread and recognized, although 
changing practice in large parts of the population 
not to let children grow up with their biological 
parents, but for example with a maternal uncle, a 
paternal sister, or with classificatory grandparents.1 
This practice points to an understanding of par-
enthood that is multiple and more flexible than in 
wide areas of „modern“ European societies. Benin‘s 
national family law (Code de la Personne et de la 
Famille), which has been in force since 2004, and 
is strongly oriented towards European legal texts, 
describes a „family“ as first and foremost a hetero-
sexual family based on marriage, in which a paren-
tal couple is equally responsible for the children 
they have together. The Benin Child Law (Code 
de l‘enfant), adopted in 2015, also sees this form 
of „family“ as the best situation for the well-being 
of children, which is why the State has made it its 
task to protect them. However, this also means that 
other constellations are regarded as less worthy of 
protection or not worthy of protection at all. This 
often leads to conflicts over the affiliation of child-
ren - for example, when local practices entrusting 
children to others are classified as „child trafficking” 
by the police or gendarmerie, or when young peo-
ple resorting to labour migration are „liberated“ 
and returned to their families.2
In most African societies marriage and matrimony 
are a way to determine the affiliation and thus also 
the rights and obligations of children in a legally 
binding way. But changing family practices raise 
new questions. In Southern Africa, for example, 
there has been a tendency for several decades to 
live together in mono- or polygamous relationships 
without formal marriage. What does this mean for 
„W
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Fig. 1: Members of a family in the province of 
Nampula, Mozambique (Photo: naTsumi / Shutter-
stock.com).
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the children born in such relationships? How are 
societies changing in which the legal regulation of 
entitlement to maintenance is increasingly being 
dispensed with? 
Refused kinship, 
creation of new affiliations
Questions of affiliation specifically arise in conflict 
and post-conflict societies. The example of the 
terrorist organisation Boko Haram, which violently 
kidnapped several hundred schoolgirls in north-
ern Nigeria, and still embroils thousands of other 
children and young people in achieving its political 
goals, is a reminder of this. It is also known that re-
bel groups and terrorist militias in Somalia, Ugan-
da, the Central African Republic, and the Democra-
tic Republic of Congo continue to recruit children, 
often by violent means.3 What does this change of 
affiliation mean for children‘s lives, and beyond this, 
for their families and communities of origin? Ques-
tions of belonging also arise when young people 
leave terrorist groups but are no longer accepted in 
their communities of origin. Although great efforts 
and some progress have been made in recent years, 
the social reintegration of former child soldiers 
remains one of the major challenges facing conflict 
and post-conflict societies in Africa.
Another indication of massive social upheaval and 
transformation are the cases in which children are 
denied kinship. In Kinshasa, the capital of DR Con-
go, which has been marked by decades of wars 
and economic crises, tens of thousands of chil-
dren live on the streets after having being accused 
of witchcraft by relatives or neighbours. This new 
phenomenon cannot be fully understood against 
the background of the country‘s violent history 
and precarious living conditions alone. It is also an 
expression of a deep social and spiritual insecurity 
within the urban population. This is caused by pro-
found transformations of established generational 
relationships, which in turn are related to new in-
come opportunities for young people - for example 
in diamond mining.4
The formation of new groups of belonging for and 
by children is also an expression of social transfor-
mations. In African cities such as Nairobi, Abidjan, 
Addis Ababa, and Gaborone, the number of child-
ren and young people growing up in middle-class 
families is increasing. In addition to school, they 
move in newly emerging social spaces such as 
playgrounds, sports clubs, amusement parks, and 
shopping malls, where they stage their middle-
class affiliation with the financial support of their 
families. On the other hand, there are also children 
in the same cities who (are forced to) manage their 
survival outside or on the fringes of family care sys-
tems. Some of these children and young people 
form their own membership groups, for example in 
the Kenyan city of Eldoret. Here they divide the city 
into demarcated areas (bases or barracks), which 
they call „California“, „Juma Haji“, or „Eastleigh“, and 
live in groups with shared responsibilities and clear 
social hierarchies. New members are subjected 
to group- and gender-specific „initiation rites“, by 
means of which initiates hope to find community 
solidarity and protection if they are admitted.5
Institutionalization of childhood
One of the social transformations that African soci-
eties are currently undergoing is the increasing insti-
tutionalization and standardization of childhood. 
Groups of children in school uniforms, so prevalent 
in the public space, bear visible witness to this. Such 
processes are linked to the comprehensive school 
enrolment campaigns that followed the 1990 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Mil-
lennium Development Goals adopted in 2000. One of 
these objectives was that boys and girls worldwide 
should receive full primary education by 2015.6 In al-
most all the African countries, government measures 
led to a historic turning point resulting in more chil-
dren now being enrolled in school than ever before. 
This is also accompanied by increasing bureaucrati-
sation, for example through the issue of birth certifi-
cates and documentation of family affiliation.
Fig. 2: Former child soldiers in the 
east of DR Congo (Photo: wikimedia 
commons / L. Rose).
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The globally initiated and nationally implemented 
school enrolment policies are still accompanied 
by intensive but scientifically underestimated ne-
gotiation processes regarding the affiliation of 
children. In rural regions in particular, families who 
live off agriculture can no longer use schoolchild-
ren as full-fledged workers on family farms. Many 
families have also become sceptical as to whether 
the many years of investment in the education of 
children will pay off in the long term. In these cases, 
their economic and social interests and constraints 
are confronted with national interests and policies. 
Such conflicts of interest are expressed in the high 
drop-out rates among pupils. In some regions, such 
as in southwest Ethiopia in 2014 and 2015, tensions 
between agropastoral families and state education 
policies have already found expression in violent 
clashes. This makes it clear that school education 
is not always a simple solution to social problems, 
but can also become a problem in its own right.7 
Schoolchildren for whom their affiliation to a fami-
ly group or to farming households is fundamental 
are constantly living in a field of tension of different 
interests and policies. How they „navigate“ this, 
and how they are located in different membership 
groups is a current topic of social science studies.
The increasing institutionalisation of childhood is 
reflected not least in the fact that the number of 
public childcare institutions has increased in many 
African countries. This is due to various factors: the 
growing need for orphanages and similar facilities 
(„foyers“), partly as a result of the HIV/AIDS crisis; 
violent conflicts, after which transit centres for de-
militarised child soldiers have been created; new 
laws on child protection; „Western“ humanitarian 
commitment and the trend towards „NGO-ization“. 
Institutions for children that are categorized as 
„vulnerable“ or „in need“ are like prisms in which 
the norms, goals and practices of different actors 
are broken. Relatives, non-governmental organisa-
tions, religious communities, and state authorities 
are all committed to protecting „needy“ children, 
but by no means act with the same normative ideas 
about what is in the „best interest“ of the children.
Globalized African childhoods
The increasing globalization of African societies 
goes hand in hand with the fact that questions 
about the affiliation of children are not limited to 
individual states or the continent. In the course of 
cross-border mobility and migration, their affilia-
tion is repeatedly renegotiated at different loca-
tions by ever changing actors.8 Thus not only state 
authorities, but also migrant parents and their 
children deal with the topic of „belonging“ in very 
different ways, as case studies on mothers from 
Cameroon living in Germany or on transnational 
families from Ghana show.9 Especially in the age of 
globalization, in which these questions extend far 
beyond parenthood, family and socialization, a pro-
cedural and fundamental political understanding 
of belonging is helpful and necessary in order to 
find adequate and context-specific answers to the 
question „Whom belongs a child to?”
„In almost all the African countries, government measures have resulted 
in more children now being enrolled in school than ever before. “
Fig. 4: In a Catholic orphanage in Benin, children learn religious 
songs (Photo: Jeannett Martin).
Fig. 3: A school class 
in Uganda starts the day 
by singing the national 
anthem (sst).
1  J. Martin: Yakubas neues Leben. Zum 
Wandel der Kindspflegschaftspraxis 
bei den ländlichen Fée (Mokollé) in 
Nordbenin, in: Afrika Spectrum (2017) 
42 (2), 219-249.
2  Cf. E. Alber: Kinderhandel in West-
afrika?, in: H. Heinen (ed.): Kinder-
sklaven – Sklavenkinder. Schicksale 
zwischen Zuneigung und Ausbeutung 
in der Antike und im interkulturellen 
Vergleich. Stuttgart 2012, 43-61.
3  Cf. documentary „Slaves – Auf den 




4  F. de Boeck: At Risk, as Risk. Aban-
donment and Care in A World of 
Spiritual Insecurity, in: J. S. La Fontaine 
(ed.): The devil‘s children. From spirit 
possession to witchcraft: new allega-
tions that affect children. Farnham / 
Burlington 2009, 129-150.
5  J. Wachira et al.: Initiation to street life. 
A qualitative examination of the physi-
cal, social, and psychological practices 
in becoming an accepted member of 
the street youth community in Western 
Kenya. BMC public health (2015), 15 
(1), S. 569. DOI: 10.1186/s12889-015-
1942-8.
6  „Ensure that, by 2015, children every-
where, boys and girls alike, will be able 
to complete a full course of primary 
schooling.” Vgl. https://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/education.shtml.
7  Cf. S. Maurus (2019), see Recommen-
ded reading.
8  U. Wanitzek (2013), see Recommended 
reading.
9  P. Feldman-Savelsberg: Mothers on 
the move. Reproducing belonging 
between Africa and Europe. Chicago 
2016; C. Coe: The Differences in 
Emotion among Parents and Children 
in Ghanaian Transnational Families, in: 
R. R. Reynolds et al. (eds.): Emerging 
Perspectives on Children in Migratory 
Circumstances. Philadelphia 2013, 37-
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For instance: Mining and railway lines in Mozambique
Hard coal from the mine in the Moatize district is shipped from the port of the 
Mozambican coastal town of Beira (Photo: Mark Zannoni / Shutterstock.com).
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t the beginning of the 21st century, Africa 
experienced a fundamental change: While 
development aid and foreign investment used 
to come mainly from the West, now economic re-
lations with the emerging countries of the global 
South, including China and Brazil, became increas-
ingly important. The deepening and expansion of 
these relations led to a geographical reorientation, 
which was accompanied by a growing influence of 
countries and companies from the South. The min-
ing industry is an example of this development. Of 
the ten companies in this sector that were world lea-
ders in terms of market capitalisation in 2018, four 
were based in so-called „emerging economies.“ 1 
As early as the end of the Cold War and particularly 
in the 2000s due to an economic outlook of high 
international commodity prices, the expansion of 
companies in the South engaged in the mining or 
processing of raw materials started to gain pace. 
Africa in particular was the target of these efforts.
Today, it is often debated whether emerging actors 
of the South will integrate themselves into the exis-
ting liberal world order or rather challenge it. In this 
context, the question is also raised as to whether 
economic cooperation with governments, com-
panies, and investors in the South offers the Afri-
can continent greater advantages than traditional 
North-South relations – not least with regard to the 
aspect of equality between the partners involved. 
Many scientific contributions see either South-
South solidarity as an opportunity and alternative, 
while others dismiss it and only see neo-colonial-
ism in a new guise. Yet one-sided representations 
do not go far enough. As it will be shown in the fol-
lowing, it is worth to take a closer look at the idea of 
„South-South relations“, and at what the various ac-
tors in politics, business, and society actually mean 
when they claim the idea of „South-South relations“ 
for themselves – and what practical consequences 
that can have.
Brazil’s South-South cooperation
During the presidencies of Lula da Silva (2003-
2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Brazilian po-
litics promoted alternative international relations 
between equal partners in the Global South.2 The 
„South-South cooperation“ discourse promoted by 
them had three core elements in relation to Africa:
   Solidarity: An altruistic attitude towards Af-
rica, accompanied by moral concerns to help 
Africans with a range of common historical, 
economic and social struggles.
   Affinity: A mutual empathy resulting from the 
cultural influence of African slaves and their 
descendants in Brazil. More specifically in 
the case of the Portuguese-speaking African 
countries, these affinities are also given by a 
common language and overlapping colonial 
experiences.  
   Tropical technologies: In the areas of poli-
tics, economics, development policies, and 
technology,it was stressed that Brazilian ap-
proaches and concepts could be transferred 
to African countries in light of similar geogra-
phical and social conditions.  
This South-South discourse, which accompanied 
and vaulted the Brazilian commitment to Africa, 
was by no means all „cast in the same mould“. 
Rather, it was interpreted and translated into prac-
tice in diverse ways according to the ideas, expecta-
tions, and goals of different actors.
Vale and its foreign relations:
The example of Mozambique 
Vale is one of the world‘s largest mining companies 
and has its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. Since 
2011, it has been the main extractor of mineral re-
sources in Mozambique. A former executive who 
A
Fig. 1: Cargo ship in the port of Nacala  
(Photo: Eric Cezne).
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oversaw the company’s arrival in the country ex-
plained: „Africa is the central west of Brazil.“ 3 He was 
alluding to the similarity of the Brazilian savannah-
like cerrado biome with the northern and centrally 
located regions of the southeast African country. 
Moreover, Mozambique ought to be transformed 
from an economically backward country into a mo-
dern export-oriented country. In connection with 
the Vale coal mine in the central-western Mozam-
bican district of Moatize, the company constructed 
the Nacala Logistics Corridor (NLC) rail link, con-
necting Moatize to the port of Nacala on the Indian 
Ocean. Here, according to the former Vale execu-
tive, the firm made use of its experience in Brazil, 
where it operates regular passenger train services 
between Belo Horizonte and the port of Vitória, and 
between Parauapebas and the port of São Luís.4 The 
new route in Mozambique was presented by Vale 
as a South-South transfer and expression of social 
commitment. Many also argue that President Lula 
da Silva „used Vale” to promote „solidarity actions” 
in Mozambique, as exemplified by his request to 
Vale executives to help financing the construction 
of an antiretroviral drug factory to fight HIV/AIDS in 
Mozambique – a development cooperation project 
led by the Brazilian state.5 At the same time, Vale 
is believed to have gained contractual advantages 
thanks to this kind of interconnectedness with the 
Brazilian government.
Political elites in Mozambique 
The Brazilian government actively promoted 
Vale‘s involvement in Mozambique as an example 
of solidarity between two countries in the global 
South. Nevertheless, many studies dealing with 
Africa‘s South-South relations overestimate the 
influence of foreign governments and corpora-
tions, while presenting Africans as passive recipi-
ents. Mozambique‘s political elites, however, have 
framed the idea of South-South cooperation in 
their own way. In resorting to this idea, they refer-
red to ideas of „national development“, „strengthen-
ing Mozambique‘s capacity to act“ or „diversifying 
the country‘s foreign relations“ in order to justify 
Brazil‘s and other emerging powers’ large-scale in-
vestments and their costs. At the same time, they 
used the South-South discourse to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the FRELIMO government.6
During the past ten years, considerable discover-
ies in Mozambique of coal, natural gas, diamonds, 
and wood have given rise to optimism about the 
country‘s future development. New partnerships 
with Brazil, China, India, and South Africa to tap 
these resources were given central importance 
by the political establishment in Mozambique.7 
South-South cooperation, it was claimed, would 
lead Mozambique out of its dependence on West-
ern aid and release an economic dynamic driven 
by foreign direct investment. Mozambique‘s presi-
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Fig. 2: Railway station on the railway line in the 
Nacala Logistics Corridor (NLC) (Photo: Eric Cezne).
Fig. 3 (right): On the railway line, the local 
population offers its goods for sale, mainly 
fruit and vegetables (Photo: Eric Cezne).
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dent, Filipe Nyusi, declared: „The development co-
operation led by the BRICS countries not only gives 
a voice to the speechless, but is accompanied by a 
development agenda that focuses (more) on our 
needs and priorities.” 8 Relations with Brazil, includ-
ing Brazilian foreign investment, were lauded for 
not being burdened by colonialism, and for break-
ing the vicious circle of economic dependency.
Recent research also shows, however: The growing 
importance of these investments have allowed 
Mozambique‘s ruling party, FRELIMO, to channel a 
considerable number of contractual relations, tax 
payments and public investments in such a way as 
to strengthen its own political and economic pow-
er. These South-South relations thus represented 
much more than the transfer of capital and devel-
opment know-how from Brazil. Vale and the idea of 
South-South relations also became components of 
the „FRELIMO party-state“ 9 capable of asserting, ex-
panding, and legitimizing its own power under the 
guise of „national development“.
Protest and resistance:
Local initiatives and their speakers 
In addition to Brazil‘s economic and political com-
mitment and Mozambique‘s political elites, there 
is a third, often overlooked factor in these South-
South relations. Proximity and solidarity across the 
South Atlantic have led to grassroots initiatives 
and local communities to critically question Vale‘s 
presence in Mozambique. Representatives of NGOs 
stress, and this is also documented by research, that 
the company brings a problematic „baggage“ from 
Brazil to Africa.10
For example, around 1,300 families were resettled 
to allow Vale’s coal mining operations in the Moati-
ze-Tete region. Critics of the project also refer to the 
tragic breach of a tailings dam in the small Brazilian 
town of Brumadinho in January 2019. They see it as 
evidence of the socially and environmentally reck-
less misconduct associated with Vale‘s mining proj-
ects at home and abroad. The initiators of protests 
against the harmful effects of these projects are 
showing transnational solidarity with the help of 
the common Portuguese language. „When a body 
part is injured and has a wound, the whole body 
feels it,“ explained the director of an organization 
offering legal assistance to mining communities in 
Tete.11 The people living there – they call themsel-
ves Atingidos pela Vale – refer to the idea of South-
South relations in order to organize a „cooperation 
from people to people“. Forms of protest anchored 
in the idea of affinity and mutual solidarity are find-
ing their way across the South Atlantic and are used 
to articulate criticism and resistance.12
„Forms of protest anchored in the idea of 
affinity and mutual solidarity are finding 















    Fig. 5: Protest in Brazil against the breach of the 
tailings dam in Brumadinho in January 2019  
(Foto: Rodrigo S Coelho / Shutterstock.com)
Fig. 4: The Nacala Logistics Corridor (NLC) 
connects the mining region of Moatize with the port 
city of Nacala (Illustration: Christian Göppner).
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Conclusion 
Vale‘s commitment in Mozambique shows in ex-
emplary fashion: Simply affirming or rejecting the 
thesis that South-South relations have their own 
character different from established North-South 
relations, does not do justice to the complex cir-
cumstances on the ground. For in both cases one 
fails to recognize the different, if not contradictory 
potentials contained in the idea of a South-South 
cooperation. The ideas and practices derived from 
this play an important role when it comes to nego-
tiating and distributing the costs and benefits of 
the extraction of mineral resources, for example. 
Most of the research work dealing with foreign 
business investments in Africa is still focussed on 
Western companies. However, it is just as important 
to get more involved in the diverse South-South 
commitments emanating from China, Brazil, and 
other countries of the Global South. They are in the 
process of actively shaping the future of the African 
continent, and beyond.
Fig. 6: Hard coal mine in the Moatize district 
(Photo: Eric Cezne). 
Fig. 7: Residential house in a local community 
adjacent to Vale‘s Moatize coal mine (Photo:  
Eric Cezne). 
1  Vale, Brazil (4th place); Shenhua Energy, China (5th place); Coal India, India (7th place); and China Molybdenum, China (8th place) (Statista, June 2019).
2  The current government under President Jair Bolsonaro represents perhaps the biggest break with Brazil‘s long-standing strategy of strengthening external relations within the global South. 
Instead, it has sought greater proximity to politically right-wing governments in the North, especially the USA. 
3  In an interview in São Paulo, Brazil, in April 2019.
4  Ibid.
5  For more details, see: https://www.reuters.com/article/health-aids-mozambique-brazil-dc/brazil-offers-drug-factory-to-aids-ravaged-mozambique-idUKL2957933720070529
6  FRELIMO is an acronym of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front). The liberation movement, founded in 1962, led the armed struggle against the  
Portuguese colonial power and achieved Mozambique‘s independence in 1975. It has been a political party since 1977, and continues to govern the country to this day.
7  See C. Alden, S. Chichava: China and Mozambique: From Comrades to Capitalists. Pretoria 2014.
8  Angola e Moçambique querem apoio dos BRICS, Deutsche Welle 27.07.2018. www.dw.com/pt-002/angola-e-mozambique-querem-apoio-dos-brics/a-44857262
9  J. Sumich: The Party and the State: Frelimo and Social Stratification in Post‐socialist Mozambique. Development and Change (2010), 41 (4), 679-698. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01653.x
10  According to an interlocutor in an interview (São Paulo, April 2019) conducted as part of the INFRAGLOB project.
11  According to the representative of an NGO in an interview conducted in 2018 in Tete, Mozambique, as part of the INFRAGLOB case study.
12  See Cezne 2019 in the Recommended readings for more.
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Africa’s infrastructure and the Global South
n March 2018, the research project INFRAGLOB 
started under the direction of Prof. Dr. Jana 
Hönke. It deals with the question of how emerging 
powers in the Global South challenge the tradition-
al practice of international relations, but also their 
understanding. The research work is carried out 
under the theme „Africa‘s Infrastructure Globalities 
– Rethinking Political Geographies from the Global 
South“ and will be funded over five years by the Eu-
ropean Research Council (ERC) with an ERC Starting 
Grant.
It will follow infrastructure projects in the Global 
South, in particular in the area of the natural re-
sources exploitation, and in rail and ship logistics. 
In these areas, Chinese and Brazilian companies are 
currently some of the most important investors in 
Africa. They introduce new corporate governance 
practices and often shape their relationships with 
social actors differently to Western norms and ex-
pectations. Of particular interest is the question of 
what influence these actors from the South have on 
current efforts to regulate transnational corporate 
relations under social and ethical aspects. 
INFRAGLOB examines these questions „from 
below“: It uses sociological and anthropological 
approaches to identify changes that arise from 
the day-to-day negotiation and implementation 
of projects and standards. The research work fo-
cuses in particular on Chinese and Brazilian port 
and mining projects on the African continent. The 
researchers follow the engineers and community 
managers who carry out these projects in Africa, 
but also mediate between company headquar-
ters and transnational forums on social regulation. 
INFRAGLOB also looks at the specific transnational 
mobilisation against large-scale economic projects 
in South-South relations, and asks how these (can) 
influence social and ethical aspects. This SPEKTRUM 
contribution is the result of a case study on Vale‘s 
involvement in Mozambique. 
I
Fig. 2: A cargo ship in the port of Kamsar is  
loaded with bauxite, aluminium, and iron ore (sst).
The EU research project INFRAGLOB
Fig. 1: Bauxite is loaded onto railway wagons  
and transported to the port of Kamsar in Guinea. 








A hand washing station set up by Unicef to prevent 
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he Ebola virus was discovered in the 1970s in a 
missionary hospital on the banks of the Ebola 
River in Zaire – now the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). Over the next 30 years, about twenty 
small outbreaks mainly in remote Central African for- 
est areas followed, with the exception of one bigger 
disease episode the city of Gulu in Northern Ugan-
da in the year 2000. The first time Ebola appeared in 
West Africa, in the Republic of Guinea in December 
2013, it quickly developed into an epidemic engulf-
ing also the neighbouring countries of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone to the South and lasting until 2015. 
The latest Ebola outbreak in the provinces of North 
Kivu and Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
which was detected in August 2018, could prove 
to be as serious as the West African epidemic. Cur-
rently, the World Health Organization has counted 
3,204 cases, of which 2,142 people have died and 
1,004 survived the infection.1 Although many in-
novative technologies such as vaccines and new 
drugs have been developed since the epidemic in 
West Africa and are utilised currently, the outbreak 
is still not under control. Long-lasting violent con-
flicts in the region, and deep resentment among 
the local population towards the state and interna-
tional actors, make the fight against Ebola all the 
more difficult. Violence by armed militias occurred 
several times. Several Ebola treatment centres oper- 
ated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
by the MSF relief organisation have been attacked. 
In April 2019, for example, Cameroonian physician 
Richard V. Mouzoko Kiboung, who worked for WHO, 
was brutally assassinated.
Distrust and resistance
For the local population in North Kivu, Ebola is 
just one of the many diseases one lives with. Some 
therefore see the attention given to Ebola by the 
government and international aid workers as sign 
of a hidden agenda. There are widespread rumours 
that the disease is not real, but a political trick to 
enrich the usual suspects. This distrust is often put 
down to ignorance and lack of understanding, but 
it is not that simple. Already in the West African 
Ebola epidemic, a lack of confidence in biomedi-
cal interventions was a major issue. In the social 
science literature, three main reasons for this have 
been identified:
   Ebola begins with high fever, diarrhoea, vomit-
ing, and other non-specific symptoms, which also 
present with malaria and cholera, among other in-
fectious diseases. Only in later phases do the char-
acteristic symptoms follow. The local population in 
West Africa, as in North Kivu, has quickly learned to 
recognise these symptoms and take the necessary 
precautions. People have adapted established tra-
ditions such as funeral rites to be protected against 
infection.2 One problem, however, remains the sys-
tematic lack of medical care for other diseases. In 
North Kivu, for example, there have been 18,201 
suspected cases of cholera since early 2019; 325 
people have died of cholera and another 3,667 of 
measles.3 However, when medical care and interna-
tional attention are only focused on Ebola, this is 
unlikely to raise confidence among the population.
   The general lack of medical care has strength-
ened mistrust of biomedical care provided by na-
tional and international institutions. Particularly in 
rural areas, people rightly place their trust in the 
home care of relatives in the event of illness. An 
international case study on the Ebola epidemic in 
Sierra Leone 4 has shown that families only perceiv- 
ed the new Ebola centres as an improvement in 
provision of care after a certain period of time.
This change in attitude took place in three steps: 
First, families began to realize that those involved in 
patient care were also the most at risk of infection. 
In addition, with an increasing number of dismissed 
survivors, the perception that Ebola treatment cen-
tres were places where people went to die gradu-
ally changed. Families recognised that Ebola treat-
ment centres offer better chances of survival than 
regular hospitals or home care. This social learn-
ing took place quickly. Many local practices were 
successfully adapted to the changed realities, and 
infection protection was successfully improvised.5 
Development of trust in Ebola treatment centres, 
however, depended on the effective flow of com-
munication from the centres to the surrounding 
communities. However, in many situations, quaran-
tine and isolation measures interrupted social con-
tact and thus communication in unexpected ways. 
Important feedback mechanisms failed at times, 
and learning from positive experiences was de-
layed. In addition, inequalities arose between those 
who knew employees in the Ebola treatment cen-
tres, and those who did not know anyone there. So 
distrust and rumours found fertile ground. Today‘s 
Ebola treatment centres have visitor zones, and 
communication with the families of patients and 
surrounding communities is taken seriously. Never-
theless, the basic principles of the Ebola treatment 
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centres, namely centralised care in a highly secure 
treatment centre, make communication between 
patients and families, families and practitioners, as 
well as practitioners and surrounding communities 
difficult to say the least.  
   Lack of trust is often based on previous experien-
ces of inadequate health systems and long years of 
government neglect, as well as the inefficiency or 
even failure of international humanitarian aid and 
development projects. Rumours that Ebola treat-
ment centres were places for blood theft, or that 
Ebola had been invented by political elites or sha-
dowy international actors, may seem irrational and 
far-fetched at first glance. However, it is important 
to recognise that many of these issues are rooted in 
experiences dating back to colonial times: colonial 
violence was in fact often accompanied by medical 
experiments and the theft of body parts, and to this 
day the unethical practices of blood and Ebola sam-
pling and the international export of such samples 
continues unabated. During the West African Ebola 
epidemic, tens of thousands of Ebola blood sam-
ples were exported from West Africa to Europe and 
the USA for research purposes without the consent 
of patients. There they are currently stored in bio-
banks and made available for research.6
The Ebola outbreak in North Kivu:
Obstacles to overcoming it
The situation is particularly difficult in North Kivu: 
The conflict, which has lasted for many years and 
„The chances of survival of Ebola patients have improved 
significantly if medical help and treatment are sought early.“
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continues to this day, has eroded confidence in 
state and international actors. The relationship 
between the state and society in the Ebola regions 
in eastern DR Congo is considerably shaped by 
the fact that the excessive violence perpetrated 
against the population by militias and the Congo-
lese army remains largely unpunished. According 
to the Kivu Security Tracker, which documents at-
tacks,7 attackers – including unpaid or underpaid 
state security forces – killed nearly 900 civilians 
and kidnapped 1,400 in the provinces of North and 
South Kivu in 2018 alone. In the Beni region, various 
armed groups, including the ADF (cf. Fig. 1), mur-
dered around 300 people in almost 100 attacks on 
villages and towns. There are currently around 4.5 
million internally displaced people throughout the 
country, 150,000 of whom have fled to neighbour-
ing countries.
Today, the Congolese state is not in a position to 
enforce its monopoly on the use of violence.8 This is 
due to corruption, a lack of infrastructure, and the 
failure of demilitarization programmes and security 
sector reforms. Above all, however, there is a lack 
of political will. As a result, more than 140 armed 
groups are active in the Kivu provinces alone. Eth-
nic massacres, rapes, looting, and forced recruit-
ment generally go unpunished. Armed groups are 
usually well-connected locally and are used by ac-
tors on international, national, and regional levels 
to assert their political and economic interests. In 
    Fig. 2: Ebola treatment centre in Butembo, DRC 
(Photo: Kennedy Wema Muhindo).
They note that no one seems to care about daily deaths from malaria 
and other infectious diseases, the lack of clean water, or surgeries that 
must be performed by candlelight because there’s no power. „You will 
leave when Ebola does,” I have heard, „but we will still be here, slowly 
dying from the diseases that have always killed us.” 
Vinh-Kim Nguyen, medical anthropologist, 
physician and doctor, working in North Kivu for the 
international organisation „Médecins Sans Frontières“.13
    Fig. 3: Patient care at the Ebola treatment 
centre in Butembo, DRC (Photo: Kennedy Wema 
Muhindo).
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addition, state security forces are also responsible 
for human rights violations in DR Congo – more 
than 50 percent of all cases in 2018.9 Human Rights 
Watch has documented these attacks in detail.10 
Even though there are differentiated concepts in 
political sociology for the analysis of complex so-
cial-state relations at the local level in the DR Con-
go,11 it suffices to note here that most Congolese 
are deeply suspicious of the state and its unpredict-
able security apparatus. This comprehensive loss of 
confidence, as the current Ebola crisis shows, can 
also extend to the cooperation partners of the state, 
not least because of the suspension of elections, 
especially in the areas affected by the outbreak. 
Despite some success, the UN peace mission MO-
NUSCO 12 as well as international aid organisations 
have been discredited for large sections of the 
population after countless scandals concerning 
arms trading, sexual abuse, and financial misappro-
priation. They were unable to prevent these scan-
dals, or were even suspected of being involved. „No 
Congo, no job,“ Congolese say laconically.
All three dynamics described – the medical under-
provision of treatment for other diseases, the prob-
lem of centralised and quarantined Ebola treat-
ment centres, and the many years of existential 
experience with state neglect and violence – com-
plicate control of the Ebola outbreak in North Kivu. 
Centrally organised and isolated Ebola treatment 
centres will only be accepted if the local populati-
on has basic trust in a benevolent and competent 
state. But North Kivu lacks the necessary conditions 
for this. In this context, it is not irrational to mistrust 
the established Ebola treatment methods of bio-
medicine, but a rational reaction based on previous 
and historical experiences with the state and inter-
national actors.
The technological progress in prevention and treat-
ment methods since the Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa has been impressive: two effective vaccines 
and one successful treatment drug are in active use, 
as well as many innovations in care that allow closer 
contact between patients, caregivers and the fami-
lies of patients have been developed. The chances 
of survival for people infected with Ebola have im-
proved significantly if medical help and treatment 
are sought at an early stage. However, this does 
not reduce the social challenges in North Kivu. For 
confidence in biomedicine to grow, it is necessary 
for the Ebola virus Disease to be understood in a 
broader societal context, in which health in general 
and the well-being of all citizens are at the core of 
epidemic containment. It is essential that national 
governments and the international community 
demonstrate in practice that they are not only con-
cerned with isolating and combating a highly con-
tagious disease outbreak, but also with improving 
the long-term health and social situation of the 
population. Only then can trust in biomedicine and 
its interventions develop.
Fig. 4: Ebola treatment centre in Butembo, DRC (Photo: Kennedy Wema Muhindo).
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Current research projects on Ebola
rom 2016 to 2019, an international research 
project led by Prof. Dr. Uli Beisel of the Uni-
versity of Bayreuth and Dr. Sung-Joon Park of the 
Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg investi-
gated the impact of the Ebola epidemic on people‘s 
trust in biomedicine in West Africa. The German 
Research Foundation (DFG) funded the project as 
one of its „German-African Cooperation Projects in 
Infectiology“. 
A case study on Sierra Leone has highlighted the 
importance of participatory mechanisms and expe-
rience-based learning when a population is affect-
ed by such health challenges. When the epidemic 
broke out in the spring of 2014, the country was sig- 
nificantly weakened by civil war, economic struc-
tural reforms, and poverty-related diseases. As the 
virus was appearing for the first time in Sierra Leo-
ne, the general public was initially poorly informed 
about the Ebola virus and its effects. As a result, the 
public was largely unsympathetic to any measures 
that had a strong impact on social life, such as the 
quarantines with which government authorities 
and international organizations sought to curb the 
spread of the virus.
Interviews with patients, nurses, and doctors have 
revealed that many promises made by government 
agencies during the crisis were not kept after the 
epidemic subsided. As a result, local medical staff 
often lost their faith in any sustainable strengthen-
ing of the health system‘s resources and the effec-
tiveness of its measures to treat and prevent highly 
infectious diseases such as Ebola. The study thus 
clearly shows that the prevailing approach in bio-
medicine, which is based on the transfer of medical 
knowledge and procedural guidelines, is far from 
sufficient when it comes to effectively combating 
infectious diseases. Instead, integrative concepts 
are required in the field of public health – concepts 
that take into account systemic, social, and psycho-
logical factors in sustainable trust-building. This is 
particularly true in countries where poverty is wide-
spread and many people have insufficient access to 
public health services.
Another research project, in which Prof. Dr. Martin 
Doevenspeck of the University of Bayreuth is in-
volved, deals with the social anthropological pre-
requisites for combating and preventing Ebola in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It is 
coordinated by Dr. Sung-Joon Park in cooperation 
with Dr. Nene Morisho, who earned his doctorate 
at the Bayreuth International School of African 
Studies (BIGSAS) and now heads the Pole Institute 
in Goma (DRC). The aim is to develop concrete 
recommendations for action in interdisciplinary 
cooperation between social scientists and health 
professionals with the aim of developing trust and 
significantly improving medical treatment and 
care for patients. The project is supported by elrha, 
a global NGO.
F
Fig. 2: Entrance to the Kenema Hospital in 
Kenema, Sierra Leone (Photo: wikimedia commons 
/ CC-BY-SA-3.0 / Leasmhar).
Fig. 1: A road sign in the DR Congo warns of 





Young people in Africa often construct their linguistic identity through a 
social code that is constitutive for membership within their own group (sst).
Identities in language
Hangovers of colonialism?
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n political circles, African countries have gener-
ally been attributed colonially-defined linguistic 
identities. These identities, implied through the 
terms anglophone, francophone and lusophone 
Africa, have colonialism lingering strongly over 
these independent countries. They reflect only one 
aspect of the linguistic plurality of these countries, 
that is, the official languages which are the heritage 
of colonialism. However, these colonial-based iden-
tities also ignore the huge range of other identities, 
linguistic and otherwise, that people project, be-
long to, engage with, or resort to in certain circum- 
stances – sometimes on a daily basis. So, besides 
just projecting an identity that is embedded in a 
former colonial language, postcolonial African citi-
zens also build identities on their native or ethnic 
languages, their repertoire of bilingualism or mul-
tilingualism, and the social codes and the mixed 
languages they speak (pidgins, creoles and bilingu-
al mixed languages) co-existing in their societies.1 
Beyond these linguistic identities, they also find 
identity hallmarks in religion, nationality, ethnicity, 
social status, culture and so forth. These multiple 
identities can be accumulated by the same indivi-
dual and could be revealed or concealed depend-
ing on the circumstances at hand.
It is worth investigating the different identities 
that Africans have acquired since the end of colo-
nialism. Language is of central importance because 
these identities are articulated through language. 
This short essay pays attention to linguistic identi-
ties in Africa, the essence of these identities in the 
lives of speakers and the mode through which they 
are constructed. While the identity categories listed 
here may be similar across many African countries, 
the categories are not without exceptions since 
each country has certain dynamics that set them 
apart from others.
 
Linguistic identities and onions: 
What do they have in common?
Before answering this question, let us look back 
into the history of complex identities in Africa. 
Long before colonialism started, Africa was al-
ready multilingual and multiethnic. Movements of 
people within the continent for trade, labour and 
matrimony account, to some extent, for its dense 
linguistic and population admixture.2 Colonialism 
only added a new set of identity layers for the peo-
ple – the colonial language being one of them. 
The new identities triggered by colonialism were 
easily accepted because the people were already 
open to similar processes in the past. There was a 
social base that was accustomed to new languages, 
ethnicities and ways of making meaning. Proof of 
this is in the effortless ways in which these multiple 
identities are negotiated in daily interactions. How 
they work is a complex process of integration into 
the society and understanding the intricacies of 
context, participants and message.
What do identities and onions have 
in common? They both have lay-
ers that open into one another. 
Linguistic identities are there-
fore like the layers of an onion. 
They can be piled on each time 
they are needed and can also 
be peeled off when they are 
not needed. These onion shape 
identities can be illustrated as 
in Figure 1. As Figure 2 shows, any 
identity can be prioritized anytime the 
need arises. The innermost layer, the core 
of any group-based identity, is the 
native or ethnic language iden-
tity. It is followed, depending 
on the community, context 
and time of acquisition 
of the language, by the 
official language identi-
ty, the dual or bilingual 
identity and the social 
code identity. 
Studies have shown how 
postcolonial identities 
are negotiated linguis-
tically in different ways 
and countries. In the 
case of the Caribbean, 
speakers perform acts of 
identity each time they choose 
a particular language or speech pat-
tern in interaction.3 In Cameroon (Africa in general), 
bilingual children born to parents from different 
cultures and languages engage in linguabridity 4 
I
Fig. 1 (above): Ideal linguistic identities.
Fig. 2 (bottom): Linguistic identity negotiation.
(Illustrations: Eric A. Anchmibe / Christian Göppner)
„Being bilingual or 
multilingual is the norm 
in most African countries.”
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when they construct themselves as hybrids of both. 
So, strategies in identity construction and identity 
negotiation tend to be very similar in most multilin-
gual postcolonial African societies. Where differen-
ces exist, they are caused by:
   the specific mix of languages, that is, ex-co-
lonial languages, pidgins, creoles and indige-
nous languages, 
   the historical routes and duration of colonia-
lism,  
   the type of official language policy practiced, 
for instance, monolingual, bilingual or multi-
lingual.
The native or ethnic language identity
It is the innermost layer of identity. It is tied to a 
geographical region (village, town, kingdom, etc.) 
that has boundaries, a culture and a language. 
Through these, members can easily exclude non-
group members. The worldview and culture of 
the group is transmitted through its native or eth-
nic language. It is this language that offers group 
members a linguistic identity. Because switching 
to the native language cuts non-members out of 
communication it is central to membership in the 
ethnic group and adherence to its norms, customs 
and traditions.
In most African communities, the native language 
is acquired first at home. It is the mother tongue 
even for people who do not speak it but are born to 
parents who come from the ethnic group that speaks 
the language. This makes the native language 
almost a natural innermost core of the linguistic 
identity onion for most people. Regional lingua 
fancas and official languages (or educational lan-
guages, e.g. Kiswahili in Tanzania) are then learnt in 
school later or in the neighbourhood. 
The official language identity
The notion of official languages was introduced 
through colonialism. Almost all African countries 
that were colonised have a colonial language as the 
sole or one of their official languages. Countries like 
Nigeria opted for a mixed policy with the ex-colo-
nial language as official language and three native 
languages as national languages. Tanzania went in 
for a dual policy with Kiswahili and English as of-
ficial languages. Cameroon, colonised by France 
and Britain, adopted a French-English bilingual po-
licy. Several countries allocated no status to the na-
tive languages at independence. The consequence 
is that their national linguistic identity is now built 
on colonial languages: anglophone, francophone 
and lusophone countries.
The official language identity is generally the sec-
ond layer since the official language is learnt after 
the native language. This identity layer is shared 
nationally as medium of education, law, internati-
onal transaction, etc. It is a symbol of upward social 
mobility, employment and social status. In some 
contexts, it functions in opposition to the native 
languages in such dichotomous categories as mod-
ern vs. primitive, progressive vs. conservative, new 
vs. old and city vs. village, along with the identity 
attributes they engender.
The bilingual identity 
and the dual identity
Being bilingual or multilingual is the norm in most 
African countries. Often this is accompanied by the 
linguistic cultural baggage that languages carry 
with them. This means some people could be bi-
lingual, that is, being able to speak two languages 
and exercise active belonging to the cultures trans-
mitted through those languages. They project a 
bilingual identity. It also means that some people 
could possess a dual identity, that is, they exercise 
active belonging to two ethno-cultural groups but 
can speak the language of only one of them. They 
belong to the one whose language they do not 
speak by birth.
If we take people’s daily interactions and switches 
across languages in Africa into account, it will be 
clear that almost everyone has a bilingual or a dual 
identity layer. How strongly this layer is prioritised 
depends on the status and prominence of the lan-
guages involved. In Cameroon, for instance, the 
bilingual identity is built on the two official lan-
guages which form the basis of the bilingualism 
national policy, while the dual identity combines a 
native language and one official language. In other 
countries, the combinations could be different: a 
native language and a regional lingua franca or the 
official language and a national language. While 
the repertoires may be diverse, the identities built 
on them are similar.
1  R. B. LePage, A. Tabouret-Keller: 
Acts of Identity: Creole-Based Ap-
proaches to Language and Ethnicity. 
Cambridge 1985.
2  Cf. S. Mufwene: The Ecology of 
Language Evolution. Cambridge 
2001.
3  R. B. LePage, A. Tabouret-Keller 
(1985), cf. n.1.
4  E. A. Anchimbe (2007), see Recom-
mended reading.
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Social group linguistic identity
Mostly youths construct linguistic identities for 
their social groups. The aim is to grant the group a 
code for in-group communication and for closing 
boundaries to others. The code could be a slang or 
a set of lexico-semantic features in an existing lan-
guage, a pidgin or creole, or a new mixed language, 
for instance, a bilingual mixed language. In the 
case of a bilingual mixed language, speakers use 
their multilingual repertoire to create a language 
for their in-group. A few examples are Camfranglais 
(Cameroon), Sheng and Engsh (Kenya). In the case 
of a pidgin or creole, Pidgin English in Ghana is an 
identity marker mostly for male youths especially 
those who consider themselves tough. Member-
ship in these groups is determined by competence 
in the social group code.
Identity management 
and social competence
Linguistic identities in Africa are therefore not static. 
They could be revealed or concealed in line with in-
teractional challenges. The decision to make them 
visible or not depends on the stakes in every com-
municative situation. At one point, an official lan-
guage identity may be projected as the main identity, 
dwarfing or completely hiding the native. At another 
point, circumstances may arise in which the situati-
on is exactly the opposite. In any case, the „manage-
ment” of one’s own linguistic identities is a complex 
process which most Africans learn from childhood, 
and which often constitutes an important survival 
strategy. Those who master this linguistic identity 
management thus demonstrate social competence, 
regardless of their social level – be it as members of 
the ethnic group, a national or of a social group.
Fig. 3: Official and national languages in African countries  
(Illustration: wikimedia commons / Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa)).
Fig. 4: The spread of the former colonial languages in African countries 
(Illustration: Christian Göppner).
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Rémi Armand Tchokothe
A public sign confirms Mayotte‘s permanent affiliation with the Comoros 
(Photo: Rémi A. Tchokothe). Small Picture: The archipelago of the Comoros in 
the Indian Ocean (Map: wikimedia commons / CC BY-SA 3.0 / NordNordWest).
A European border in Africa
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cursory glance at the world map would sug-
gest the Comoros, an archipelago in the In-
dian Ocean consisting of four main islands, forms 
a single geographical unit. But a very eventful his-
tory, shaped in many respects by colonialism, has 
led to the fact that its political, social, and cultural 
conditions today are very complicated.
    Since 2001, three of the four main islands – 
Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli – as well as 
some smaller islands have formed the „Union of the 
Comoros“, an independent federal island state. In 
2011, the fourth main island, Mayotte, was included 
as the 101st Département in the Republic of France, 
and has been part of the European Union since 
1 January 2014. The starting point of this „split“ was 
a referendum in 1974: On Mayotte more than 63 
percent of voters opted to remain with the former 
colonial power France, while on the other three is-
lands well over 90 percent voted for political inde-
pendence. Strengthened by France‘s restrictive im-
migration policy, large sections of the population 
on Mayotte today consciously distance themselves 
from the neighbouring islands. In the final round 
of the 2017 French presidential election, Marine Le 
Pen, a candidate for the Front National, who had 
campaigned for more rigorous immigration laws, 
won around 43 percent of the vote. Many obviously 
feared that immigration from neighbouring islands 
would endanger their own prosperity. As early as 
2016, Mayotte was the subject of protests and vio-
lent attacks against so-called „migrants“, who were 
blamed by some groups for rising crime and unem-
ployment. In 2018, renewed unrest led to talks with 
the government in Paris aimed at intensifying the 
fight against „illegal migration“. In order to public-
ly demonstrate the will to bring this situation to a 
head, President Emmanuel Macron visited the main 
island on 22 October 2019 on a modern high-speed 
patrol boat (intercepteur) from Petite Terre, a small 
island belonging to Mayotte.
   But at the same time, the islands of the Como-
ros archipelago have much in common: historical 
experiences dating back to pre-colonial times, lan-
guages, traditions and religious orientations, but 
also the cultural diversity of the local population. 
To this day, there are numerous family connections 
between the inhabitants of various islands. Conse-
quently, crossings to Mayotte are not experienced 
as „migration“ to a foreign country, but as mobility 
within a historically, socially, and culturally related 
archipelago. Against this background, the Comoros 
Government, the African Union, and the UN have 
launched various diplomatic initiatives to change 
Mayotte‘s status. They always failed, however, be-
cause France, as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, has now ignored 22 UN resolu-
tions on the subject.
A closer look at these complex relationships reveals 
structures and developments that affect relations 
between Africa and Europe as a whole. Although 
Mayotte belongs to France and offers some advan-
tages and privileges to its island population, many 
people feel disadvantaged here. An initiative in 
2016 to combat the high cost of living on the island 
met with a broad public response. In essence, it 
was an appeal to France to ensure that the popu- 
lation of Mayotte enjoyed the same economic 
benefits as French citizens elsewhere. Moreover, 
Shimaoré, the language of the Mahorean popula- 
tion, is disadvantaged compared to French, the only 
official language. Both linguistic cultures exist side 
by side, without any creative development taking 
place through mutual exchange. The impression 
that Shimaoré should be deliberately pushed back 
is widespread. As a result, Mayotte‘s internal rela-
tions with France still reflect the old North-South 
relations between a European colonial power and 
its African colonies.
Seen from the islands of the Union of the Comoros, 
however, Mayotte does not present itself as a disad-
vantaged island, but as a place of longing. In 1997, for 
example, demonstrations were held on the neigh-
bouring island of Anjouan, calling for union with 
France. It was hoped that a recolonization by France 
would bring economic and social advantages, 
as they had supposedly already been realised 
A
Fig. 1: View of the harbour of Mamoudzou, the 
capital of the French overseas department Mayotte. 
(Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-2.0  / David 
Stanley).
Fig. 2: Rémi Tchokothe and Samir Dupont in Do-
moni on the Comoros island of Anjouan. On a clear 
day one can see as far as the coast of Mayotte  
(Photo: Mr. Kamal).
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on the island of Mayotte. Even today, despite the 
now stricter visa regulations, the people on the 
neighbouring Comoros islands try almost daily to 
transfer to Mayotte in small „Kwassa-kwassa boats“. 
Here they want to see family members again, go to 
medical care centres, secure a better school educa-
tion for their children, or find long-term work. But 
very often, the boats capsize without any chance of 
rescue. Unnoticed by the international public and 
the media, tragedies occur almost daily, like in the 
Mediterranean, where people from Africa die trying 
to reach Lampedusa and other islands belonging to 
European states. The 70 kilometre wide waterway 
that separates the Comoros islands of Anjouan and 
Mayotte is therefore referred to by Comorians as 
„the largest ocean cemetery in the world“.
The historical and political geography of the Como-
ros also inspires literature – be it in bizarre, comedic 
or angry, aggressive ways. In the following, two lit-
erary works will be examined in more detail. Their 
authors, Nassur Attoumani and Soeuf Elbadawi, 
were both born in the Comoros capital of Moroni. 
With their works they want to challenge critical re-
flections on political and geographical aspects of 
life in the archipelago, and in doing so, make the 
aftermath of colonialism visible.
„Death visa“
The play „Autopsy of a dead body“(Autopsy d‘un 
Macchabée) by Nassur Attoumani is a satirical 
chamber play. There are four people on the stage: 
Macchabée, a dead body; Mahossa, a Mayotte res-
ident and fundamentalist Muslim; Chikungunya, 
a forensic pathologist named after a tropical viral 
disease; and Iblis, the outcast Satan. Mahossa dis-
covers Macchabée in a mangrove swamp on the 
island of Mayotte. He is pleased that the villagers 
want to bury the body immediately in the cemete-
ry, according to the rules of Islam. Yet Chikungunya 
intervenes: As spokesman for the French Republic, 
he calls for compliance with the laws in force on the 
island. He insists on an autopsy, in which he unin-
tentionally and comically relates legal precision and 
scientific objectivity to each other. Thus the forensic 
expert marks a contrast between the cultural practi-
ces of the predominantly Muslim Mahorians and 
the legal claims of France. He accuses the corpse, 
which comes from the neighbouring island of Gran-
de Comore, of having illegally entered French terri-
tory. He intends to use the autopsy to bring him to 
justice. Moreover: He implicitly accuses the corpse, 
and the population of Grande Comore, of having 
abandoned their own „paradise“ by voting for poli-
tical independence, and of having created the rea-
sons for their „emigration“ themselves.
When Mahossa resists autopsy, Chikungunya 
threatens to press charges against him for being 
an accessory to murder. Thus he projects on the re-
presentative of the population an accusation which 
should actually be directed against the French state: 
In the Comoros, the term ‚death visa’ (Visa de la 
mort) is used not only to refer to the legal entry do-
cuments issued by the French authorities, but also 
Fig. 3: La Grande Mosquée du Vendredi at the 
harbour of the Comorian capital Moroni (Photo: 
Rémi A. Tchokothe).
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Fig. 4: Nassur Attoumani on the beach on  
Mayotte (Photo: Rémi A. Tchokothe).
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metaphorically to the life-threatening sea-crossing 
by Kwassa-kwassa to Mayotte. The majority of islan-
ders apply in vain for a visa, but many of them risk 
their lives getting to the desired island anyway. In 
this context, the Senegalese writer Boubacar Boris 
Diop speaks of the „Damned of the Sea“ (Damnés 
de la Mer) – alluding to the famous book title „The 
Wretched of the Earth“ (Les Damnés de la Terre) by 
Frantz Fanon, the theorist of decolonization.
„The day of mourning“
The French visa policy and its consequences are also 
the subject of the poem „A mourning song for our 
dead, with anger between their teeth“ (Un Dhikri 
pour nos morts. La rage entre les dents) by Soeuf 
Elbadawi. A dhikri is a prayer, a ritual act of remem-
brance, which takes place 40 days after the death of 
a human being. The author adapts this literary form 
to expose France‘s visa policy as an instrument of 
neo-colonialism: It imposes violent demarcations on 
the population of the archipelago that run counter 
to their common history, and makes people „illegal 
migrants“ when they want to enter „the land of their 
ancestors“. Just how much the French Republic be-
trays its revolutionary ideals of freedom, equality, 
and fraternity, in the author‘s point of view, is ex-
pressed in a contrafaction of the first verse of the 
Marseillaise: „Arise, children of the Fatherland / Our 
day of glory has arrived“, the national anthem begins; 
„Arise, drowning children of brothers and sisters / 
Our day of mourning has come,“ is what Elbadawi 
exhorts instead. While the French original appeals 
to citizens to fight bravely against the soldiers of ty-
ranny, the dhikri contains the desperate resigned ap-
peal to board the „fatal boats“ and begin the journey 
across the sea – where voracious sharks with blood-
smeared mouths wait for the next drowning passen-
ger. The catastrophic end of the boat trip to Mayotte 
brings back memories of the colonial era: For it was 
by sea that the people of the Comoros, Mozambique, 
and Tanzania were abducted overseas as slaves.
Literature as critical geography
Today, the term „critical geography“ encompasses 
a series of research approaches that regard geogra-
phical spaces as products of power structures, of 
claims to power, of violence and dependence, but 
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Fig. 5: Nassur Attoumani near the radar station 
on Mayotte, with which boats leaving Anjouan are 
monitored (Photo: Rémi A. Tchokothe).
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also of emancipation and resistance. From this per-
spective, spatial structures should be examined in 
terms of how they are shaped by processes in which 
questions of justice and solidarity, of freedom and 
emancipation, are negotiated and decided. From 
this perspective, the works of Elbadawi and Attou-
mani can be read as vehicles of committed critical 
geography. The political map forms the backdrop 
for texts that do not set out borders, but seek to 
change them in the memory of their victims.
Nevertheless, both authors have focused the 
production and marketing of their works on the 
French literary scene, and have written their works 
in French rather than in the Bantu languages of 
Shimaore or Shikomore. In an interview, Attouma-
ni explained that he did not want to rely on the 
uncertain conditions of reception that prevail in his 
restrictive surroundings. If his play had appeared 
in Shimaore, there would have been no guarantee 
of it being received at all, Attoumani explained in 
an interview. He therefore did not wish to heed the 
appeal of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong‘os, to use the poten-
tials of African languages for a „decolonization of 
the mind“ in his own literary practice. Furthermore, 
both authors have published their works in French 
publishing houses or publishing groups based in 
Paris. And yet, Attoumani lamented, three years 
after the release of Autopsy d‘un Macchabée, that 
as a French-speaking author native to Mayotte, he 
was not really recognized by French publishers as a 
national author.1
But why should an author like Attoumani work to-
wards the reception and recognition of his works in 
Paris? Mayotte recently hosted its second interna-
tional book fair (after 2017) - with a wide range of 
literary agents coming not only from neighbouring 
islands but also from Madagascar, Réunion, Mo-
zambique, Tanzania, and Kenya. Those who looked 
around the book stands and attended the rich pro-
gramme of events experienced a stirring dynamic: 
The borders on the map of literatures from Africa 
certainly seem to be changing.
Fig. 6: View from the island of Mayotte to the la-
goon of Dembéni. In the foreground, buildings of the 
Université de Mayotte (Photo: wikimedia commons 
/ CC BY 2.0 / Jean-Pierre Dalbéra).
1  N. Attoumani, R. A. Tchokothe 
(2017): „Le petit Mahorais apprend 
à écrire de droite à gauche à l‘école 
coranique, ensuite de gauche 
à droite avec l‘alphabet Latin.“ 
Unpublished interview with Nassur 
Attoumani.
„The internal relations between Mayotte and France 
still reflect the old North-South relations between a 
European colonial power and its African colonies.“
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s a literary scholar at the University of 
Bayreuth, you have been offering regular 
seminars at the Université de Mayotte for sever-
al years now. How would you describe the pro-
file of this university so little-known in Europe?
The Université de Mayotte – its official name is 
Centre Universitaire de Formation et de Recher-
che – opened in 2012. Currently there are about 
1,500 students enrolled, many of the approxi-
mately 30 lecturers come from France. Mainly 
bachelor programmes are offered, which are 
spread over four fields of study: Business Stud-
ies/Administrative Science, Law and Geogra-
phy; Literature; Mathematics; and Biology. Most 
of its students were born on Mayotte, foreign 
students come mainly from the other Comoros 
Islands or Madagascar.
How do students and teachers deal with their 
„double identity“? Do they see themselves as 
belonging more to the academic world of France 
or to an East African scholarly culture?
That is one of the key questions. Some students 
and colleagues from Mayotte like to emphasize 
their affiliation to France – one could speak of 
a staged identity. This is often accompanied by 
contempt for and discrimination against „mig-
rants“, even on the University campus!
Unfortunately, attempts have been made on 
African soil in recent years to offer an education 
oriented towards France that is quite removed 
from local realities and thus from the life experi-
ences of the students. In this context, the Sene-
galese writer Boubacar Diop speaks of a forma-
tion déformante. I myself fear that under these 
conditions no double culture but only a kind of 
double inculture can emerge – a state in which 
a demarcation to East African cultures is drawn, 
but the formation of a viable French identity 
fails. I am therefore all the more pleased that 
many students and some colleagues have now 
recognised this, and are working to detach 
teaching content from colonial heritage.
How are literary studies at the Université de 
Mayotte structured?
The curriculum in literary studies to this day 
consists mainly of the study of „French litera-
ture and culture“ – and this does not mean the 
French-speaking literatures from African coun-
tries, but the literature of France. Especially 
works by writers from the 18th and 19th centu-
ries are compulsory reading. In my opinion, that 
is quite anachronistic. To make matters worse, 
lessons are not even used to teach students 
stylistically good writing and speaking. In fact, 
stylistically, they do not speak their own nati-
onal language as confidently and flawlessly as 
one would expect.
Do you see any chance that literatures from Af-
rican countries will be acknowledged more in 
the future?
Three years ago I gave a public lecture at the 
University entitled „Ce que peuvent les Études 
Africaines“ („What African Studies can do“). In 
order to promote the decolonisation of litera-
ture studies, I have proposed the establishment 
of a department for Mayotte studies. This idea 
has indeed been taken up, and the University 
is now organising a further training course in 
Société, Langues et Cultures de Mayotte. Most 
of the participants come from France, or have 
family roots there, but work on the island. 
I myself offer a course on the global relevance 
of Swahili and literatures in this language. Es-
pecially contemporary authors from Kenya and 
Tanzania are important to me. Swahili is a Bantu 
language that has adopted many words from 
Arabic and is close to the Comorian languages. 
As an ancient trading language of the Global 
South, it is widespread in East Africa as far as the 
Arabian Peninsula and has various cultural roots. 
Therefore, language and literature teaching in 
Swahili is very well suited to broadening the cul-
tural horizons of students to countries in their 
own geographic neighbourhood. It is very mov-
ing to see the enthusiasm with which students 
take part in this course, and how they can iden-
tify with topics and contents they have come 
into contact with for the first time in their lives. 
I have also invited the writer Nassur Attoumani, 
who lives on Mayotte, to this course. Because it 
is important that students not only get to know 
„old“ texts from Europe, but also get into conver-
sation with authors from Africa who are still alive 
and to whose texts they can relate. The students 
were enthusiastic about this event, which at first 
was just an experiment – and now my colleague 
Buata Bundu Malela repeats it several times a 
year. At his invitation, I came to Mayotte in 2015, 
which resulted in close cooperation. In this con-
text he participated in the International Fellow-
ship Programme of the University of Bayreuth.
A
INTERVIEW WITH DR. RÉMI ARMAND TCHOKOTHE
Swahili as a medium of decolonization
    Fig. 1: Entrance to the Université de Mayotte (Photo: 
wikimedia commons / CC-BY-2.0 / Jean-Pierre Dalbéra).
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Stacey Gillian Abe: Sylvia´s Letters to my future self (2017). Small 
picture: Stacey Gillian Abe, Indigogo 2 (2018) (Photos: Stacey Gillian Abe).
Character and beauty
Artists in residence and their artistic work in the Iwalewahaus
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he word „Iwalewa“ comes from the language of 
the Yoruba, an ethnic group in the south-west 
of Nigeria, and means: „Character is beauty.“ Found-
ed in 1981, the Iwalewahaus of the University of Bay-
reuth is today an internationally known centre for 
contemporary African art that is unique in Europe. 
It does not see itself as a „Kunsthalle“ in the traditi-
onal sense, but as a laboratory that combines crea-
tivity and scientific research, and attaches impor-
tance to inclusiveness. It reaches out to the public 
with exhibitions, publications, film screenings, and 
performances, for which it receives acclaim, not only 
in Germany, but far beyond. The exhibition „Future 
Africa Visions in Time (FAVT)“, conceived within the 
framework of the Bayreuth Academy of Advanced 
African Studies, developed into an international 
event of great note. In cooperation with the Goethe-
Institute, it made stops in several African metropoli-
ses, opening in the Rwandan capital Kigali in Novem-
ber 2019. 
By combining the public presentation of art with new 
ideas for its creative appropriation, the Iwalewahaus 
possesses a strong attraction for artists and curators 
alike, as well as for art lovers from the most diverse ar-
eas of culture and society. In many respects, the Artists 
in Residence are the defining influence on the work 
in the Iwalewahaus: Artists from Africa come to Bay-
reuth for stays of several weeks in order to gain fresh 
inspiration, to work on pictures, films, or installations, 
and to convey insights into their artistic work. In the 
Iwalewahaus they often take part in the vernissages 
of exhibitions in which their own works are shown. 
In 2015, the Iwalewahaus and the International Of-
fice of the University of Bayreuth launched the Iwa-
lewa Art Award as a joint initiative. Every two years, 
young, up-and-coming artists from Africa who have 
already made an international name for themselves 
are honoured. The award ceremony is combined 
with an artist residency at the Iwalewahaus and an 
exhibition at the University of Bayreuth.
T
he winner of the 2019 Iwalewa Art Award 
is the Ugandan artist Stacey Gillian Abe. 
In her more recent works, she draws inspiration 
from poetic and documentary texts compiled 
and archived by the founder of the Iwalewahaus, 
Ulli Beier, in particular an anthology of African 
creation myths and a collection of poems in the 
Yoruba language. Stacey Gillian Abe wants to 
explore the emotional content of the texts, their 
stories and deeper relationships, and visually 
reinterpret them. She mainly uses video formats 
and photographic prints as her material, experi-
menting with technology (long-term exposure), 
materials, and technology (cyanotype). These 
days, her artistic work features at renowned in-
ternational art exhibitions. In 2018, she was list-
ed by „Forbes Africa Under 30“ as one of the 30 
most creative personalities from Africa.
T
Stacey Gillian Abe
Fig. 1 (left below): Artist Stacey Gillian Abe 
(Photo: Jürgen Rennecke).
Fig. 2: Stacey Gillian Abe: Seat of Honor #2 
(2017) (Photo: Stacey Gillian Abe).
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inshasa, the capital of the Democratic Re-
public of Congo, is the starting point of the 
artistic work of Méga Mingiedi Tunde. In his exhi-
bition „Kinshasa – Bayreuth“, which was shown at 
the Iwalewahaus in 2019, he linked the cultural 
and political heritage of both cities in order to 
stimulate existential reflections on networking 
in a globalized world. The exhibits included 
images of real buildings, flashbacks into history, 
consumer habits and advertising slogans, as well 
as bus tickets, bottle labels and other traces of 
everyday life in both cities. Characteristic of the 
Kinshasa-based artist‘s work are large-format 
cartographies of imaginary urban spaces, in 
which he explores the cultural imprints of ar-
chitecture, mobility, and economic influences. 
Historical events, present living conditions, and 
future potentials flow into each other, and form 
a cosmos shaped by the „simultaneity of the 
non-simultaneous“.
K
Méga Mingiedi Tunde 
n 2017, Kitso Lynn Lelliott from Johannes-
burg was awarded the Iwalewa Art Award for 
her project „Alzire“. During her artistic research 
on the transatlantic slave trade, she discovered 
the court of Margravine Wilhelmine von Bay-
reuth. In the 18th century a woman named Al-
zire worked here, who probably came from Su-
rinam in South America, where many enslaved 
people with West African roots worked on sugar 
cane plantations. With a video installation, the 
prizewinner brings this story back to life: Alzire 
appears as a ghostly figure in the New Palace in 
Bayreuth, where she conjures up the time of co-
lonialism, when people were forcibly uprooted 
from Africa and deported to other continents. 
Other works by the artist, which were created 
in Europe, Brazil and West Africa, also revolve 
around the relationship between forgetting and 
memory. The leitmotif of her works is to present 
her own history in contemporary places with the 
forms of expression of magic realism.
IKitso Lynn Lelliott
    Fig. 3 (left): Artist Méga Mingiedi Tunde (Photo: Christian Wißler).
    Fig. 4 and 5: Méga Mingiedi Tunde, exhibition detail: Kinshasa – Bayreuth (2019) (Photos: Iwalewahaus, University of Bayreuth).
Fig. 7 and 8: 
Kitso Lynn Lelliott, 
Video Still: Alzire 
of Bayreuth (2015) 
(Photos: Kitso Lynn 
Lelliott).
Fig. 6: Artist Kitso 
Lynn Lelliott (Photo: 
private).
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n July 2019, Mbongeni Buthelezi from Johan-
nesburg visited the University of Bayreuth for 
the first time. He had brought along six expressi-
ve portrait paintings, which at first glance could 
be confused with oil paintings. The colourfully 
structured surfaces are made of plastic, which 
the artist extracts from waste using original 
techniques he developed himself, and uses as 
an artistic material. By creatively dealing with 
the properties of sculpture, Buthelezi wants to 
point to destructive living conditions such as 
lack of hope for the future, impoverishment, 
and environmental pollution in his works, but 
also to show that the world can be changed for 
the better with courage and commitment. His 
works have already been shown in international 
exhibitions in South Africa, the USA, Germany, 
England, Spain, and other countries. In Bayreuth, 
they were also met with lively interest from sci-
entists engaged in microplastics research – in 
March 2020, a joint project with the University 
of Bayreuth’s Collaborative Research Centre on 
Microplastics will expand on this connection.
I
Mbongeni Buthelezi 
assine Balbzioui, an internationally acclaim- 
ed multi-media and performance artist 
who lives in Marrakech, has been associated with 
the Iwalewahaus for many years. Since 2015, he 
has also visited the Iwalewahaus at the invita- 
tion of Freundeskreis Iwalewahaus e.V. (Friends 
of Iwalewahaus) as Artist in Residence. The ex-
hibition „MAD“ in summer 2019 with pictures, 
figures, and video installations offered a broad 
overview of his work: a multifaceted fantasy 
world that radically opens itself to the public 
and invites them to linger, to experience creati-
vity. Humorous, ironic, and bizarre motifs can be 
found, as well as images of horror and silence. As 
Yassine Balbzioui points out, good relations to 
an institution like the Iwalewahaus are of great 
value for one‘s own artistic freedom. His work 
in Bayreuth includes performance workshops 
with young people, a collaboration with the Bay-
reuth-based porcelain manufacturer Walküre, 
and the production of the opera „Ghost Flowers“ 
at the Richard Wagner Museum in 2018.
Y
Yassine Balbzioui
    Fig. 9 - 12: The 
artist Mbongeni 
Buthelezi at the  
exhibition of his 




Fig. 13 (left): Yassine Balbzioui, Double Sight (2017) (Photo: 
Iwalewahaus, University of Bayreuth).
Fig. 15: The artist Yassine Balbzioui in front of the poster of 
his exhibition „MAD“ (Photo: Christian Wißler).
Fig. 14 (above): Yassine Balbzioui, Atelierdetail: MAD 
(2019) (Photo: Iwalewahaus, University of Bayreuth).
Language Media Art 
A wall painting by the Moroccan artist Yassine Balbzioui ex- 
tends over two floors of the staircase in the the University of Bayreuth’s 
Iwalewahaus. Freundeskreis Iwalewahaus e.V. (Friends of Iwalewahaus) made pos-
sible this work with the title „Flying Wall“, which was created in summer 2017. Real places 
and scenes from the surroundings of the Iwalewahaus combine with a colourful cos-
mos populated by mythical creatures. „I believe we can fly together“, said the artist 
on the occasion of the presentation of his work, which, with its abundance of 
colours and forms, invites you to make new discoveries over and again.
Indeed, the fantastic stories contained in the mural inspired the 
composer and pianist Simon Vincent to create a corresponding 
musical world of sound. At the opening of the exhibition 
„MAD“ by Yassine Balbzioui, curated in 2019 by Nadine 
Siegert and Katharina Fink, his composition „Confé-
rence“ was experienced publicly for the first time. 
The piece of music is yet another contribution 
to the inclusive approach of the Iwalewa-
haus: It is a space where exhibits can be 
                                    experienced with 
                                     all the senses.
„Flying Wall“
